EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The *Afghanistan Campaign Plan Measures of Effectiveness Project* aims to identify criteria by which Canadian Forces personnel assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan could observe the progress of their work on a micro level, based on the macro operational campaign plan identified by DND. The criteria by which activity progress is measured has been synthesized from four primary social science disciplines, including history, geography, ethnography, and post-conflict reconstruction and has been built from base-line Canadian Forces (CF) documents, amongst others, that are informing PRT operations in Afghanistan.[1] This report is **Part 1** of the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) project and reviews the policy, literature, and existing MOE systems applicable to the CF mandate in Afghanistan, and presents a post-conflict reconstruction MOE model adaptable to the CF mission. **Part 2** consists of the Field Message Book and **Part 3** is the MOE Software package on CD ROM, both contained in the project presentation binder.

The model developed is a sophisticated yet low-tech solution for soldiers to observe day-to-day progress in the field, as well as a high-tech solution to promote sound decision-making and a formula for reporting progress back to soldiers operating in the field. It also provides a way for the CF to become invested in network-centric post-war reconstruction initiatives.[2]

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[1] This includes only the documents available prior to 1 November 2005.

[2] *It is critical to note that the content of this observation system is intended as the first phase of a multi-phased process of development by the CF. This phase should not be viewed as the final stage of measuring effectiveness in post-conflict reconstruction. It should evolve as the CF continues to work in post-conflict reconstruction within the ever-changing context of global peace and security.*

The project has considered measures of effectiveness with an understanding of the overlap between post-conflict reconstruction and military stability operations. The final MOE system focuses on solutions to the following questions:

1. *What are we measuring?* The CF will measure progress related to specific post-conflict reconstruction tasks in Afghanistan that support the decisive points within each line of operation, especially the security sector as outlined in the current Afghanistan Campaign Plan;
2. *Why are we measuring it?* The CF will measure progress to provide a standardized system of measurement by which soldiers and decision-makers can make informed, real-time decisions that minimize the negative impacts and maximize the positive impacts of activities on stakeholders, including the CF itself;
3. *Where is 'measurement' meaningful for the CF?* Measurements of effectiveness will be meaningful to the CF in the soft and hard post-conflict reconstruction activities of which it is mandated to complete in support of the Government of Canada's commitment to Afghanistan.

More often than not, there is the danger that post-conflict reconstruction activities have potentially negative effects on recipient populations and this is especially so in politically sensitive and unstable high-risk environments such as Afghanistan. Currently, there are no established systems of measuring impacts, progress, or effects of reconstruction activities on human populations in post-conflict environments; though, there exists a myriad of ill-conceived *ad hoc* systems that do not contribute to reconstruction because they cater to the political or economic advancement of those funding such post-conflict reconstruction mandates.

The Government of Canada (GOC) has set out a five-year country strategy for Afghanistan, but in terms of achieving positive progress in post-conflict reconstruction activities, this time frame is not feasible for the CF to realize the GOC mandate. However, it *is* enough time to observe progress of post-conflict reconstruction activities, consistently over-time, to establish a baseline for future progress reporting and

comparisons between theatres of operations. Therefore, it becomes critical to assess and measure CF impacts in order to positively address the stabilization of Afghanistan for the people of Afghanistan.

It will take time and commitment to build a foundation of reliable data upon which to make informed decisions on progress in Afghanistan. Only by implementing a qualitative and quantitative system will the CF be able to observe their progress in Afghanistan.

With direction from Colonel P. Stogran, Commander CFJOG, Peace and Conflict Planners has created a standardized MOE approach employed through an innovative redesign of the basic CF Field Message Book. It was the goal of Peace and Conflict Planners to use tools that have common CF familiarity and purpose of use. To our knowledge this is the first instance of the CF Field Message Book having been redesigned to support mission-specific activities. The post-conflict reconstruction Observation Reports are now included in the first half of the CF Field Message Book and are the foundation of the MOE project.

With direction from Major I. Rutherford and Captain M. Mendez, Peace and Conflict Planners has developed a network-centric, real-time communications and command MOE database and archival technology software. This tech package catalogues CF personnel Observation Reports as found in the Field Message Book. As the information is collected and integrated into the tech database, a real-time archival system is created by which more sophisticated and consistent decisions regarding post-conflict reconstruction activities can be made.

The GOC has a five year mandate in Afghanistan, which is an adequate timeframe for CFJOG to fully operationalize and test this MOE system, through a comprehensive

understanding of PRT efforts that minimize the negative effects while maximizing the positive effects of successful post-conflict reconstruction activities. The CF has the opportunity to apply its experience of using systems of measuring progress in typical operations to the contemporary context of PRTs in Afghanistan and in other theatres of operation in which it is involved in post-conflict reconstruction. There is also an opportunity for the Canadian military to become an international leader in this field by implementing this useful system of measuring effects in post-conflict reconstruction activities that can then be duplicated throughout the international community.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

3-D	Defence, Diplomacy, and Development
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
BPA	Bonn Peace Accords
CA	Canada
CAE	Country Assistance Evaluations (World Bank)
CAW	Contemporary Armed Warfare
CF	Canadian Forces
CFJOG	Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development, United Kingdom
DND	Department of National Defence
EBO	Effects-Based Operations
ECHO	European Union's Humanitarian Aid Department
FAC	Foreign Affairs Canada
GAO	US Government Accountability Office
GOA	Government of Afghanistan
GOC	Government of Canada
IAG	Illegally Armed Groups
IC	International Community
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IPS	International Policy Statement
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
PACD	Post-Armed Conflict Development
PCR	Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Pers.comm.	Personal Communication
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSEPC	Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
RBM	Results-Based Management
RC	Regional Command
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RR	Rural Reconstruction
SSR	Security Sector Reform
US	United States of America
UN	United Nations
UR	Urban Reconstruction
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

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INTRODUCTION

The *Afghanistan Campaign Plan Measures of Effectiveness Project* aims to identify criteria by which Canadian Forces personnel assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) could measure the effectiveness of their work on a micro level, based on the macro operational campaign plan identified by DND. The criteria by which results of activities are measured will be synthesized from four primary social science disciplines, including cultural geography, sociology, history, and peace and conflict studies and built from base-line Canadian and non-Canadian documents currently informing the CA PRT operations in Afghanistan. The final project must consider measures of effectiveness with an understanding of the overlap between post-conflict reconstruction and military stability operations.

Peace and Conflict Planners (PCP) was requested by Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group (CFJOG) to undertake this work. PCP is a collaborative research company that brings together many of Canada's top post-conflict reconstruction theorists and practitioners with experience in the military, political, diplomatic and corporate sectors. They are academic, humanitarian, military, and business professionals who are highly qualified and internationally respected for their ongoing contributions in post-conflict reconstruction, peace, and security. Dr. Sarah Meharg is PCPs founder and has been active in developing theory and praxis of post-conflict reconstruction for thirteen years. The PCP team has a deep loyalty to the Canadian Forces and the Government of Canada.

PCP has been able to contribute a broad and profound comprehension of the complexities of post-conflict environments and the necessary requirements in measuring progress to create success. As well, PCP brings an understanding of the international

operational structures used by the Government of Canada, the Canadian Forces, Foreign

Affairs Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, domestic and

international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations and its sub-

agencies, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

PCP specializes in identifying future trends in international PCR activities,

sectors, and countries. PCP takes innovative, multifaceted, and advanced technological

approaches to our research development and support of our contributions to PCR,

peacekeeping operations, peace and security operations, combat operations, and policy

development. Our solutions provide macro-level frameworks that flexibly telescope to

support micro-level activities of complex post-conflict realities.

PCP incorporates advanced information and web-based technologies to build

economic and cultural connections in progressive and transitional communities,

especially those affected by armed conflict. PCP specializes in applying cutting edge

research to real-world problems through innovative products, projects, and services that

sustain communities over time and benefit cultures and economies.

PCP builds capacities between municipal, provincial, and federal governments,

agencies and other groups to develop emergency and strategic plans to protect local

cultures, economies, and identities from the adverse impacts of natural disasters, warfare,

and globalization. PCP pre-empts possible disaster and conflict, offering customized pre-

planning emergency response packages.

PCP provides a unique integrative approach to our client projects. We believe

strongly in the interconnectivity of multi-disciplinary projects and their applicability to

transitional development, peace, and security. Our professional team provides extensive

theoretical and practical experience in areas of post-conflict reconstruction, human rights

monitoring and evaluation, protection of cultural heritage, developing economies in transition, economic acceleration, developing cultures in transition, promoting ethical industry expansion, new market assessments, humanitarian development projects, military innovations, and peace and security strategies. Currently, we are researching emergency response and post-conflict reconstruction best practices; developing economic and cultural acceleration strategies; inventing technologies that empower change; implementing strategies and policies for real-world challenges; and are actively contributing to the transformation of failing states, post-conflict reconstruction, and disaster affected areas.

PCP support to CFJOG and the success of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan will be ongoing. Due to the short time frame for the research, design, and development of this project and the lack of existing, relevant, and rigorous post-conflict reconstruction measures of effectiveness systems, it has become clear that development should be continuous during the Afghanistan campaign. PCP will dedicate its resources to the continued support of this important tool that contributes to international post-conflict reconstruction success.

The CFJOG is based at Kingston, Ontario. Its mission is to provide a rapidly deployable, joint operational-level command and control capability for complex domestic and international operations. It enhances CF interoperability and is responsible for theatre activation; disaster assistance response team; and deployable headquarters. It gives the CF a significant operational command-and-control capability and provides a rapid-reaction capability. It serves as the link between the military's strategic and tactical components, ensuring that the CF can deploy rapidly and effectively to crises anywhere

in the world (Godefroy, 2002:1). In this way, CFJOG will be instrumental in supporting the mission to Afghanistan.

Canada's overarching goal is to prevent Afghanistan from relapsing into a failed state that provides terrorists and terrorist organizations a safe haven to strengthen and continue their work. Canadian efforts in Afghanistan have significantly contributed to the overall consolidation of peace internationally and the improvement of human security. It is intended that Canada's efforts will continue to help improve the quality of life for the Afghan people and help ensure that the progress made is sustainable.[3]

Measuring the progress of CFJOG support to post-conflict reconstruction activities has become a priority under the mandate of the Afghanistan Campaign Plan. According to the CFJOG, measuring progress is a large and complex effort and measures of effectiveness (MOE) are required to assess such progress in Afghanistan. Moreover, the CF is required to coordinate its efforts at home and in military theatres with other government departments regarding activities in Afghanistan. The triad of defence, diplomacy, and development (3-D) is a whole of government approach to fulfilling the GOCs mandate.

The GOC has four main departments, which focus efforts beyond domestic activities. These are foreign affairs, defence, development, and international trade. For the purposes of this report, there is a focus on the first three, but it is important to note that eventually the GOC will embed trade into the 3-D equation.

Since 2001, Afghanistan has received the greatest concentration of Canadian resources for non-domestic activities. Canada ranks in the top ten of donors to

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[3] Foreign Affairs Canada, "Rebuilding Afghanistan: Backgrounder". (Ottawa: FAC), online: http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/background-en.asp (date accessed: October 2005).

Afghanistan. From 2001 to 2004, the GOC created new foreign policy focus areas and in

2005 released the long-awaited *International Policy Statement* (IPS). The IPS reflects a

more focused approach to international peace and security and the new 'whole of

government' response that is intended to strengthen Canada's role in non-domestic

activities. The IPS lists Afghanistan as a primary focus area for Canadian foreign policy

initiatives. The IPS maintains three areas of effort that potentially impact the Afghanistan

mandate. These are: countering terrorism, stabilizing failed and fragile states, and

combating proliferation. At this time, political rhetoric suggests that Afghanistan is an

international hot bed of terrorist activity and training.[4] Based on this rhetoric, the GOCs

mandate has been further focused to help Afghanistan become a stable, democratic, and

self-sustaining state and to ensure that it never again serves as a "terrorist haven."[5]

On 16 May 2005, Defence Minister Bill Graham stated that the commitments for

Afghanistan were consistent with new Canadian international and defence policies, which

are to demonstrate Canada's emphasis on bringing stability and humanitarian relief to

fragile states. He also stated that by assuming leadership roles in these areas Canada

would pave the way for a secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan state.

The GOC has made a five-year funding commitment to Afghanistan and related

activities. The envelope is from 2005 – 2010. On 21 July 2005, the GOC released the

statement *Canada in Afghanistan: The International Policy Statement in Action*, which

divides the PRT mandate into two main tracks. The first is to achieve governance and the

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[4] However, since then, Jim Judd, Director of the Canadian Secret Intelligence Service, has gone on record to state that Iraq has become the "post-graduate faculty for terrorism," and fears that a new generation is learning terrorist skills in the war-torn country and will bring the violence home to Canada (Toronto Star: 2005-10-20). Shifts such as this will impact the GOC commitment in Afghanistan and will, most likely, see a re-shuffling of resources allocated to containing terrorist activities.
[5] Reference to so-called "terrorist havens" was originally made by Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew on 16 May 2005.

second, to reform the security sector. These two tracks, supplemented by a third, which is

to provide compatible security support to the development sector, can be viewed as the

GOCs road map for success in Afghanistan.

The subtext throughout the policy statements suggests that security is the lynchpin

for all other successes in high-risk environments. This would imply that although the

policy approach is 3-D, the CF bears the most responsibility to create the foundation

upon which all other activities rely.[6]

The GOC mandate is simple, yet the operationalization of the mandate is unduly

complex and poses challenges related to any new inter-operable or inter-departmental

framework. For the CF to effectively provide security and contribute to the overall

success of a 3-D approach in a high-risk environment, the CF requires current, real-time

data reporting including MOEs from those involved in the 'whole of government'

approach in Afghanistan. The CF mission success in a 3-D operation requires all actors to

quickly communicate MOE information to the CF and from the CF to other actors.

Centralizing such data will inform the mission at all levels; be of use to the Canadian

PRT and Brigade Commanders; and provide the much needed baseline data to measure

progress, either positive or negative. With consistent use over a multi-year period, this

MOE system will *holistically* measure effectiveness, and contribute to the evaluation of

the Afghanistan Campaign.

Each department measures fulfillment of mandate and related time commitments

with a distinct scope and scale and with a different spectrum of actors and services. These

differing notions will impact the ways in which effectiveness is measured, compared, and

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[6] This is further substantiated by Canada's Ambassador to Afghanistan, Chris Alexander, in his comments at the official PRT transfer of authority ceremony in Kandahar on 16 August 2005 (DND press release NR-05.069).

understood within the defence, diplomacy, and development departments. It will also impact the longevity of the mission in Afghanistan. Eventually, it will become critical that the notion of time and effectiveness be somewhat standardized within reporting systems between defence, diplomacy, and development activities in Afghanistan. To not do so will lead to incongruence with the Afghan government, weak or misleading reporting to the GOC, and misunderstandings between the GOC and the Canadian public.

In August 2005, Dr. Meharg was contacted by Col P. Stogran of CFJOG with a request to build an MOE system to measure the progress of the CF post-conflict reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. The MOE project was to be a sophisticated, yet user-friendly system to replace the *ad hoc*, commander-dependent MOE approach that exists within the CF. In addition, Col Stogran requested a plan that could eventually be shared with the other departments contributing to the Afghanistan mandate. Most importantly, however, the final product was to be easily implemented at the soldiering level, but be rigorous enough to inform decision-makers.

Col Stogran and Dr. Meharg agreed that the Afghanistan Campaign Plan Measures of Effectiveness project aims to identify criteria by which CF personnel assigned to PRTs could measure the effectiveness of their work on a micro level, based on the macro operational campaign plan identified by DND. Field observations would need to be nested within the greater MOE plan to have relevance. Measuring effectiveness is a way by which CF personnel deployed to the high-risk environment of Afghanistan will be able to see that what they are doing on a day-to-day basis is making some kind of difference, which in turn, strengthens their 'sense of purpose', their 'cohesion' and their 'motivation' within the CF.

It was also expressed that measuring the relationship between costs, time, activities, and impacts, and moving the CF mandate forward are critical areas that require a thoughtful approach. Using a measuring system to capture these relationships and connections will be beneficial to meeting mandates in the field. The research process resulted in a disturbing conclusion. After the literature review was completed, it was concluded that no MOE existed to base a design upon, and many organizations that have been tasked to produce MOEs in the past, have failed. This includes the British Department for International Development (DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the RAND Corporation.[7]

In subsequent meetings with Maj. I. Rutherford and Capt. M. Mendez, an alternative requirement was expressed. Canada is moving towards adopting frameworks for network-enabled, effects-based operations. In order to meet this future requirement, the MOE system should be interoperable within a greater system of actors, including other Canadian departments, the US, Britain, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

So, in fact, two types of systems were requested and PCP has responded to both. The first has been designed for the CF personnel in the field carrying out the CF mandate in Afghanistan, and the second has been designed for the decision-makers and their new technological information frameworks that underpin command, control, and coordination.

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[7] For more information, refer to DFIDs Evaluation Report EV 647 (2004), *Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Afghanistan*, and the report by the United States Government Accountability Office (2005), *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of US Goals.* Report to Congressional Committee. GAO-05-742. July.

RESEARCH PROCESS

Questions

Based upon the established project parameters, the available information provided by CFJOG, and the information analyzed from the literature review, the project design was based upon the following research questions:

1. What system of measurement will capture the qualitative and quantitative nuances of progress of post-conflict reconstruction activities in moving forward the CF mandate in Afghanistan?

2. What types of post-conflict reconstruction measurement systems exist now that are employed by international community actors? Are they sufficient for capturing progress relevant to the CF mandate?

3. If a measurement system existed for purposes of tracking progress in both hard and soft post-conflict reconstruction activities, what would it include? How would it work? Who would use it? For what purposes?

Factors

Based upon the established project parameters, the available information provided by CFJOG, and the research process, the following factors were established and informed the final MOE system. These included:

1. The CF is mandated to work within the 3-D approach regarding a country strategy for Afghanistan and is required to give adequate security support to the other actors involved in the reconstruction process.

2. The CF are deploying their first PRT, to be part of a wider international PRT effort in Afghanistan.

3. No rigorous post-conflict reconstruction MOE tool exists that would be adequate in scope or design to support consistent progress observation and reporting.

Assumptions

Based upon the established project parameters, the available information provided by CFJOG, and the information analyzed from the literature review, the following assumptions were made regarding CFJOG needs and requirements based on an MOE system:

1. There exist systems of measuring effectiveness currently employed by various departments, agencies, and stakeholders.

2. A robust measurement system does not exist to adequately track progress of 'soft' post-conflict reconstruction activities, project performance indicators, impact, or effectiveness for recipient populations, the Canadian PRT, the 3-D actors, or the GOC.

3. The CF have utilized *ad hoc* mission specific MOE systems for measuring combat operation activities.

4. The CF does not have a standardized MOE system for measuring progress of non-combat operation activities, other than CIMIC and Info Ops, that is at a high level of sophistication and incorporates qualitative and quantitative data;

5. The CF deployment to Afghanistan is for five years, 2005 – 2010.

6. Canada currently leads Regional Command South (RCS). The leadership will be assumed by the United Kingdom and Holland respectively between 2006 and 2007, and then it is planned to rotate back to Canada in September 2007.

7. This MOE project will <u>not</u> be establishing cause and effect relationships rather it aims to provide a system of measuring progress and impacts of activities implemented by the CF to meet its mandate in Afghanistan.

An extensive literature review was conducted in four major fields of inquiry:

1. History (armed conflict);

2. Geography (cultural, political);

3. Ethnography; and

4. Post-conflict reconstruction studies.

Exhaustive research was completed on historic and contemporary post-conflict reconstruction best practices and lessons learned literature existing in the public domain. A review of other systems and methods of measuring in the social sciences, development, defence, justice, business and technology sectors was also completed. Their applicability to measuring post-conflict reconstruction activity effectiveness in Afghanistan was a part of the development phase. Analysis regarding trends in effects-based operations structural models and their relevance to this MOE project are included here within. The final MOE system is based upon the most relevant systems of measuring effectiveness in the field of post-conflict reconstruction. Research identified best and worst practices of measuring post-conflict reconstruction activity effectiveness. Measurement components have been identified based on this analysis and are embedded in the MOE system for the post-conflict operational environment. The literature upon which the final MOE system is based is listed in the List of References at the end of this report.

LITERATURE REVIEW

For purposes of this project, the term 'landscape' is the medium upon which post-conflict reconstruction activities occur. Landscape is not considered 'terrain', and this literature review illustrates the implications of landscape in post-conflict reconstruction and shows it to be the lynch pin through which activities can impact a war-torn society. In fact, landscape is the medium through which cultures and identities are represented, and when landscape is destroyed during armed conflict, cultures and identities are also destroyed or deeply impacted. Therefore, landscape becomes the medium by which post-conflict reconstruction activities can positively impact the redevelopment of cultures and identities of war-affected peoples.

Culture and Landscape

The context of the geography of place and the notion of landscape as a cultural practice in creating and supporting a sense of identity are paramount to understanding destruction and post-conflict reconstruction activities and praxis. Landscape is thought to provide a certain context within and upon which humans work, and also provide the complex boundaries within which people remake themselves and are worked upon by the landscape they have constructed (WJT Mitchell 1994; D. Mitchell 2000). Osborne argues that as societies evolve and change, places become dynamic and reflexive sites of identity formation. There is an ongoing reciprocal relationship between people and places (Osborne 2002a:9), and we are active agents in producing our cultural identities (Jackson and Penrose 1993).

Significant discourses of landscape are nature, culture, identity, and agency and can illuminate behaviours and actions. As a result, landscape acts as a vessel of memory and meaning, and reflects histories and narratives. The importance of landscape is

especially apparent in times of conflict when the very sight of another culture's symbols can create tension and "territorially limited social integration and belonging" (Werlen 1993:175). Entrikin argues that social attitudes govern our ability to control and manipulate our environments, and in extreme cases, this attitude can perpetuate the total destruction of natural and cultural landscapes (1991:43). Only recently has landscape emerged from reification to "become a potent tool of cultural analysis" (Zukin 1991). Yet, we find that the design of measurement systems tends not to use culture as a framework for analysis, and thereby lacks meaningful ethnographic analysis.

Culture anchors people to place and creates continuity of experience and orientation in the world (Connerton 1989; Osborne 2002a). Place becomes unique and particular because it is where a series of events happen, both real and imagined. This sense of place is a synthesis of nature and culture based on a historical past recalled by both individual and collective memories. As argued by noted cultural geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan, a sense of place is grounded in the particularity of place and is required for people to feel a sense of belonging (1974).[8] Local styles[9] of design are unique and embody the past; they represent the modes and methods of history in a particular place and create familiarity, repetition, and orientation. Usually vernacular style refers to the patterns, colours, texture, scale, and line used in design, placing one in a specific time and place. Similarities of style may exist between places but there are distinctions in quality, scale,

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[8] Eco-psychologists contend that people feel a sense of disconnectedness with nature and require conditions of cultural justice, equality, and racial equity. Like Tuan, eco-psychologists are concerned with human identity in relationship to place, ecosystems, and nature (Keepin 1995).

[9] "Local" is itself a contentious term. Who are "locals?" Is this the group that lived in a particular place before the war? Or are these the new locals who moved to a particular place after the war? This study considers locals as *indigenous*, and foreigners, as *outsiders*, for example outside expertise, rather than foreign expertise.

texture, line, and colour - all of which create a sense of place, or *genus loci*, and symbolize the group that created the place.

As elements of symbolism and meaning create a particularity of place, they also act as narratives of collective memory that underpin the cohesion and identity of groups (Halbwachs 1941, 1980, 1992; Connerton 1989; Fentress and Wickham 1992; Hutton 1993; Gillis 1994; Nora 1994), in fact, "reinforcing the common practice of conceiving place-based social relations as particularistic" (Entrikin 1997:264). This particularity of place reinforces ethnicity, culture, and identity. Marc Fried, noted sociologist, argues "even familiar and expectable streets and houses, faces at the windows and people walking by, personal greetings and impersonal sounds may serve to designate the concrete foci of a sense of belonging somewhere and may provide special kinds of interpersonal and social meaning to a region one defines as 'home'" (1972: 233). The localization of familiar elements creates a sense of place that makes it distinct from other places. Such elements may be churches, homes, streets, trees, landscapes, town centres, place names, art, memorials, and people act as *cues* for expressing identity.[10]

Such rhetoric is collectively loaded onto the elements constitutive of place. Some places have great value to the cultural groups that subscribe to them, and the markers that suggest heritages, sacredness, and a collective past assist people to remember and to give meaning to their lives (Sack 1997:135). Places, with their defining material elements, become a part of the mythology of cultures and the building blocks of identity. Places charged with meaning weave together identity and culture, and can be naturally or culturally generated. Some societies choose places because they are extraordinary natural

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[10] Although there are other elements, symbols, and signs, which form identity (i.e. folklore, music/song, and ideology), this chapter focuses upon the *material* elements of cultural identity (i.e. architecture, place, landscape).

phenomenon, and assist people with symbolic rites and customs. Alternatively, people also choose places for rites and ceremonies; mark them with art, architecture, or sacred objects; and then the places become symbolically charged. Both types have distinct cultural significance, and examples of each can be seen around the world.

Landmarks are elements that strongly link people with landscape. For Lynch, "landmarks are the simple physical elements which may vary widely in scale... Once a history, a sign, or a meaning attaches to an object, its value as a landmark rises" (1960: 78-81). Others have engaged Lynch's material landmark further by theorizing such markers as immaterial, symbolic, and sacred. Thus, for Halbwachs, landmarks act as tools that concentrate or gather salient events, times, places, and circumstances. Landmarks enable us to locate ourselves within a social framework of space (Halbwachs in Coser 1992:175). They serve as reference-points for the psychic terrain of space and time. Nora suggests that they are *lieux de memoires* that constitute the "realm of memory" and underpin contemporary identity and cultural practice (Nora 1996, 1997, 1998). Landmarks are often the conceptualizations of symbolism, sacredness, and a sense of place, as they crystallize meaning and circumstance influenced by cultural practice. Such landscapes act as mnemonic devices for contextualizing the past and future and ground identity to place.

Further, landscape representation through symbolism, myth, legend, and tradition is an important aspect of nationalism that aids in the building of national and regional identities (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Connerton 1989; Hutton 1993; Schama 1995; Cosgrove and Daniels 1988; Daniels 1993; Agnew 2001; D. Mitchell 2001; Osborne 2001b). Landscapes play a significant role in the "genesis and organization of

ethnonationalists and anti-state political movements" and serve as the ideological

foundation upon which political movements can mobilize popular support (Agnew 2001).

The question of place and identity ownership has become an area of geographic

research, for landscape and identity are inseparable from territoriality (D. Mitchell

2001:275). National identity, represented through landscape, is critical to our

understanding of both identification and belonging (Daniels 1993). As elements of

culture and ethnicity materialize in the landscape, there is but little choice for those who

work in these landscapes to identify with these particular places (Mitchell 2000:119). The

politics of particular identities, often fuelled by nostalgic representations of the past, have

motivated a generation of new political leaders fighting new wars (Ignatieff 1993, 1999;

Dodds 2000). In fact, "the dominant culture's meta-narratives are challenged by counter-

narratives that critique the dominant culture as former occupants of the periphery move to

the centre and erode its underpinning structures" (Osborne 2002b:321). The lure of

control, and of staking a cultural claim in a particular locale to declare autonomy and

identity are strong factors of both regionalism and nationalism today.

The primary focus of culture has been seen as a compendium of habits, customs,

heritage, tradition, collective memory, monuments, and the culminations of certain rituals

and performative arts. Culture can be understood as an active force in social practices and

is the "negotiated process and product of the discourses through which people signify

their experiences to themselves and to others" (Gregory and Smith 1994:116). Simply

put, culture is what we say, what we do, and what we mean, and may be "the medium

through which people transform the mundane phenomena of the material world into a

world of significant symbols to which they give meaning and attach value; and hence,

culture is the very medium through which change is experienced, contested, and

constituted" (Cosgrove and Jackson 1987:95).

In fact, culture is often viewed as the past, rather than aspirations for the future

(Appadurai 2001). Ideas of the future are a part of culture and it is critical to strengthen

cultural capacities in order to develop along the lines of the aspirations of the people most

affected by them. In poorer areas, ideas of development have traditionally been directed

from outside sources, rather than from within by indigenous people. There is a distinction

between those giving assistance and those who are assisted. These models are applied to

developing nations, and although there has been much criticism on these actions in poorer

areas, they are definitely not appropriate for post-war areas. A series of factors exist in a

post-war environment that do not exist in a developing nation. Nevertheless, the toolbox

of development has been applied to post-war areas with the belief that the results would

be similar.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Culture, and Landscape

The complexities of reconstructing place not only reside in the spatial, but also in

the temporal. The relationship of space and time allows people to reorient themselves to

now, and to omit one or the other is to leave people disoriented in their experience of

place. Rebuilding post-war societies is somewhat dependent upon collective memory and

experience. The temporal experience is most easily reclaimed through the collective

memory of the remaining pre-war population. This can be accomplished by marking the

events of the past in the context of the present to assist in strengthening collective

memory.

The treatment of landscapes that mark violent or tragic circumstances has varied, and Foote argues that, "violence and tragedy have the power to transform landscape and alter meaning over long periods of time" (1997:4). Similarly, Neil believes that trauma shapes self-identity and national identity through collective perceptions of society (1998:36).

Reconstruction can take many forms. Both commemoration and memorialization seek to remind, but Lowenthal contends that "purposeful forgetting" (1996) allows history to recede beyond collective memory. It also allows societies to pick and choose parts of the past to generate a sense of believable and pride-driven national heritage that is infused into the landscape, and reflected back towards a society.[11] Yet, Young (1993) contends that this purposeful forgetting cannot completely cleanse a landscape loaded with an undesirable circumstance, such as evidence of concentration camps, political regimes, battlegrounds, and places marking tragic events (Foote 1997; Nora 1996; Hutton 1993).

Osborne builds a strong argument for our human need to remember and recollect activities and experiences, particularly after conflict. Moreover, rebuilding after war becomes a collective rite for civilian populations who lose their homes and are "expunged from the landscape" due to warfare (2000:515). The post-conflict reconstruction of daily life occurs *ad hoc* and rather informally; whereas, the "memorialization, commemoration, and performance constitute the formal mechanisms by which we attempt to incorporate the past into our collective memory" (2000:513).

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[11] There is also an urge to seal up the past in order to forget by superimposing new ideals onto old landscapes (Lowenthal 1985, 1994, 1996; Nora 1996), as in the dissolution of the Monasteries in England during the reign of Henry VIII to reform the Church of England in the direction of Protestantism, or the Marshall Plan's objective of eliminating all Nazi symbolism from the German landscape after WWII through economic reconstruction initiatives.

Such post-war collective remembering takes many forms, and Pierre Nora suggests that

the collective memories of a group can survive through the use of mnemonic devices,

which ease the burden of remembering (Nora 1996).

Connerton suggests that "to remember is to make the past actual (...) and what is

remembered is the historical narrative of a community" (Connerton 1989: 46). The power

of identity lies in the re-telling of the story, and this becomes possible when places are

reconstructed and meaning loaded onto landmarks. In post-war communities there is a

need to reconstitute the built environment of past political and national ideologies to re-

establish an identity in the absence of one. The Nazis sacked historic Warsaw to cripple

the will of the Poles, who quickly rebuilt the medieval centre exactly as it had been; "it

was our duty to resuscitate it", explained the conservation chief. "We did not want a new

city ... We wanted the Warsaw of our day and that of the future to continue the ancient

tradition" (Cibrowski 1964:48). By selecting and preserving destroyed symbols, places,

and landscapes representative of cultural identity, the task of reestablishing identity is

eased, knowing that the mnemonic devices can do the remembering for a people.

When conflict is suspended by third party intervention the post-war environment

is often characterized by an absence of the rule of law and increased human rights abuses.

In a transitional environment, there are usually functioning, yet weak, state institutions.

The typical reaction of the international community is to repair material damage and

promote both governance and development activities with the aim of effacing the effects

of violent armed conflict. The areas of concern for the international community in

attempting to bring peace to war-torn societies are repatriation, resettlement,

reconciliation, reintegration and reconstruction. Organizations import relief and

development policies into war-torn communities in order to return to pre-conflict *status*

quo or to develop a new social order based upon good governance and the rule of law, as

in Afghanistan. Hidden agendas, corruption, and neo-colonialist attitudes have created a

particular environment in Afghanistan that is made much more intense and complex by a

lack of security. Yet, international community involvement in complex crises and post-

war situations is often noted for an overlap of assistance, '*ad hocery*', and a lack of

coordination, which ultimately undermines the effectiveness of international efforts,

including security initiatives (ICG 2001:9).[12] This suggests a dearth of systems by which

to measure the work that is meted out on recipient populations in post-conflict situations.

Measuring the effectiveness of activities supported by the international community comes

as an afterthought to intervention in crises and there is an apparent lack of sophisticated,

analytical reporting on post-conflict reconstruction activities and their impacts upon

recipient populations.

Post-conflict reconstruction comprises five distinct parts: economic, judicial,

social, security, and infrastructure. Historic records, case studies, and agency reports on

post-conflict reconstruction projects create the bulk of post-conflict reconstruction

literature. Post-conflict reconstruction involves a proactive program of physical and

social rebuilding in an attempt to address and rectify the underlying causes of recent

conflict and create the foundations for sustainable stability and development.[13] Part of the

problem with cohesive post-war mandates is dependent upon the complexities of the term

reconstruction, which conflict and overlap. Post-conflict reconstruction has many

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[12] This statement is also based on various personal communications with the following theorists and
practitioners: Riedlmayer, Andras. 2002. Librarian, Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture, Fine Arts
Library, Harvard University, Cambridge MA. Telephone Survey. 2 July and Email communication 28
August. Walasek, Helen. 2001-2002. Researcher, The Bosnian Institute, UK. Telephone Survey. 10
October 2002 and various E-mail communications. Coward, Martin. 2002. Professor of Political Science,
University of Sussex, UK. Survey. 11 July. Craig, Jay. 2002. Director, Bosnia Network, Birmingham AB.
Telephone Survey. 3 July, 16 August.
[13] This definition of post-conflict reconstruction is widely used in theory by the IC, but rarely implemented
in practice. This particular definition is proposed by the World Bank (1998).

different meanings and includes an entire range of tasks such as re-connecting interrupted water supplies, re-building rail and road networks, re-organizing societies, rebuilding cultural heritage, and repairing individual shattered lives. After emergency aid and basic reconstruction mitigates the immediate effects of conflict, post-conflict reconstruction aims to rebuild social, economic, cultural, political, and judicial systems.

Within the rubric of reconstruction, most international community involvement supports economy-building, although policies and programs foreground the discourses of capacity building; multiculturalism; reconciliation; and the building of conciliatory spaces. Yet the potential that physical reconstruction can have as a catalyst for peacebuilding is often overlooked (Barakat 1994:1). UNESCO supports this claim by arguing that cultural reconstruction plays a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction and should not be underestimated in the reconciliation process, because it federates communities and gives hope. Moreover, the reconstruction of cultural landscapes of wartorn societies may be the element that contributes most to the long-term sustainable recovery of a society.

Many view Afghanistan as a series of ruins – architectural, political, economic, and cultural – which merely need rebuilding in order to reconstitute a sense of normality. The ruins of Afghanistan are not only rubble to be bulldozed to make way for new constructions, but are wounds of culture and identity.

While the intent of contemporary armed conflict is to target the relationship between people and their places in order to weaken identity and create anomie, new policies of post-conflict reconstruction require an alternative framework that creates relatedness between people and their landscapes of identity. This aim should be the first

priority of re-building war-torn societies after the completion of basic infrastructure and emergency aid and assistance.

Unfortunately, many actors within the international community act as colonizers, who direct culturally specific projects dependent upon designated funding and lack of standardization or respect of indigenous vernacular codes. Outside groups may enter a country under the pretence of providing materials, expertise, and funding for post-conflict reconstruction, but this aid is directed to a limited spectrum of projects in line with the outside group's political, social, and/or religious ideologies thereby building partisan projects which do not fit within a vernacular landscape. In fact, post-conflict reconstruction is a misnomer. What we are experiencing now is post-war *construction*. Strong ideologues *radicalize* the landscape by imposing non-indigenous frameworks onto an indigenous system to gain power or to import and strengthen an ideology, such as democracy, in a war-torn society. In doing so, they take advantage of the circumstances of post-war disarray. This radicalization of landscape capitalizes upon the effects of war. Further, different groups and ideologues have competing claims on post-war territory, resulting in bitterly contested ownership of symbolic spaces. Competing hegemonies create new symbolic identities that were not present in pre-war places.

Terrains of opportunity appear in post-war environs as the international community levies its power over some reconstruction projects and leaves others to become radicalized by powerful outside parties. For example, in Bosnia, attempts to ethnically cleanse Muslims during the conflicts backfired because the newly cleansed sites were considered contentious international community projects, and were left to attract funding from other groups. Fundamental Islamic groups jumped at the opportunity to reinstate the Muslim identity in the Bosnian landscape. Now, new Mosques and

Islamic institutes dot the landscape creating a sense of solidarity, yet these places are representative of an alien architecture and religion, which clash with more discreet vernacular religious styles and beliefs.

It is clear that such theories of landscape have not been applied to contemporary post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. Post-conflict reconstruction can contribute to the radicalization of societies because the methods by which the IC can support post-conflict reconstruction and development are not standardized. As well, reconstruction reports are produced in a *de facto* manner and lack coherent, rigorous, and robust progress measurement systems.

Interestingly, unsuccessful projects can effectively marginalize groups, such as women and children, and can escalate tensions between ethnic groups and even support the return of a pre-war hegemonic dominance in a community. These projects have so-called *negative unintended consequences*. Although third party intervention has good intentions, there are many barriers to successful reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, social programming to reduce war trauma and further victimization, and repairing a torn social fabric caused by sociological abuse.[14] Keith Doubt (2000) suggests a need for powerful post-war sociological recovery for war-torn societies that move beyond the economic discourse of post-conflict reconstruction projects and programmes.

Historical reconstruction discourse posits that there is often a social need to reconstruct life as it were in order to regain a sense of place and normal everyday life

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[14] According to Keith Doubt's *A Sociology after Bosnia and Kosovo* (2000), a social fabric is successfully 'torn' when extensive human rights abuses are committed by belligerents, ranging from murders, torture, and the unfathomable rapes of daughters by their own fathers. Belligerents create their own 'style' of abuse that multiplies the complexity of an emergency, and renders impotent most peace-building social programs.

(Leung 1989; Clout 1996; Nasr 1997; Osborne 2001a).[15] It appears that the factors that

play the greatest role in shaping the rebuilding patterns of an area are influential no

matter the cause of the destruction, natural or human (Nasr 1997:xxi). Clout contends that

war ravaged France was able to regain quick economic productivity through sheer

determination after WWI. People recovered agricultural lands from live ordnance, barbed

wire, and the human remains, which were the exigencies of war. Clout takes a statistical

overview of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts and these appear to highlight the use

of indigenous initiatives, rather than outside expertise, perhaps significant to the quality

and quantity of the vernacular used in the reconstruction of homes and cityscapes.

A small number of publications dwell upon the ideological underpinnings of

reconstruction after natural (floods, mudslides, earthquakes) and human (major armed

conflict to small wars) disasters.[16] Nasr argues that there is a distinction between the

destruction caused by natural disaster and that caused by human disaster; a distinction not

previously made by reconstruction practitioners.[17] Nasr concludes that planning and

reconstruction reaction to natural disaster destruction is the *tabula rasa* technique that

treats the landscape as a clean slate and rebuilds, even demolishes the urban landscape

with a forward-looking vision (Nasr 1997).

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping

authored by former United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995), is a

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[15] In a conversation with Prof. Hok-Lin Leung of the Urban and Regional Planning Department at Queen's University, author of *Reflections on the Reconstruction of Tangshan, China*, he stated that a primary concern of 'victims' after a disaster is to start regular, paid work once again. This appears to give people a sense of pride in themselves thereby helping them recover mentally and emotionally from traumatic shock.
[16] Using Louis Nasr's understandi,ng of disasters, in the broadest sense they encompass situations caused by 'acts of nature', accidents and wilful human acts – most importantly wars (1997:341).
[17] This report suggests that a significant distinction exists between unplanned destruction caused by an earthquake or flood, and the systematic, intentional destruction of landscapes of identity through cultural warfare, and as a result, there should be a significant difference in the treatment of the reconstruction decisions.

contemporary exposition of the UN Charter created in 1945. Boutros-Ghali defines and contemporizes concepts such as peacekeeping, peace-making, peace-building, and peace-enforcement. His notion of post-conflict reconstruction falls under the auspices of peace-building. Boutros-Ghali argues that post-conflict reconstruction is a significant aspect of reconciliation necessary in securing stable post-war environments (Montville 1990; Lederach 1996). The international community has their own organizational mandate, and their own particular interests in reconstructing Afghanistan. These groups bring their own money, expertise, and material into the country and complete projects. This leads to lack of transparency in post-war planning, as each group wants to give high priority to their own agenda and coordination.

Adding to the post-conflict reconstruction security issues and current praxis, there continues to be an absence of information sharing in post-conflict reconstruction theatres, which reduces transparency amongst the plethora of international community members involved in peace-building (Rubin 1998; Lederach 1994, Maynard 1996, Pugh 1998; Cox 1998).[18] Although the multiplicity of partners can pose difficulties[19], the variation of parties bring specific capacity-building roles to theatre (Rubin 1998:16), yet Maynard contends that there is also a lack of coordination between actors involved in peace-building (Lederach 1994; Maynard 1996). Therefore, it would follow that there is a real

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[18] A PRDU workshop report contends that when unsubstantiated post-conflict reconstruction methods are applied to addressing the effects of complex emergencies, success rates are low unless intense interaction and information gathering is completed through indigenous initiatives before the reconstruction phase is begun. According to the PRDU publications, unsuccessful projects can effectively marginalize groups such as women and children, and can escalate tensions between ethnic groups, even support the return of a pre-war hegemonic dominance in a community. Although third party intervention has 'good' intentions, there are many barriers to successful reintegration of IDPs and refugees, social programming to reduce war trauma and further victimization, and repairing a torn social fabric caused by sociological abuse.

[19] The multiplicity of partners can pose difficulties. Their efforts can undermine each other, communicating different messages; and relevant actors may either play different would-be interveners off against each other or seek to incorporate some of them into their own political agendas (Rubin 1998:17).

requirement for a network-centric system to advance the international community's work

in post-conflict reconstruction.

      Colin Kaiser, UNESCO Chef de Bureau Sarajevo, believes that the idea of culture

is simply too problematic for inclusion in post-conflict reconstruction and organizations

would rather concentrate on familiar projects that do not necessarily result in progress

towards a recovered nation-state:

> To reconstruct a building is one thing. To reconstruct a
> cultural life or dynamic among different groups is
> something that no one knows how to do, simply, nobody
> knows. The thing is that we don't have the techniques to
> reconstruct culture. Nobody knows what the techniques are.
> I think that's a very important and problematic thing. The
> discourses on cultural pluralism that we all know and can
> find in other organizations don't mean anything here
> because here there are a series of specific dynamics, which
> require an understanding of society. To understand how a
> society works is really important in order to help to put it
> together and it's basically a question of trying to create the
> channels where those interactions can take place, that's all,
> and we don't know how to do those things. And so
> everyone is pushing [agendas]. This is a colonial structure,
> but without the balls of colonialism, so it's a halfway house
> where we are because we don't have a colonial ethic. This
> is a very difficult place, and we don't know how to do it,
> and to reconstruct landscapes of identity – we definitely
> have no idea, haven't got a clue (Kaiser pers. comm. 15-10-
> 02).[20]

Andras Riedlmayer, director of the Bosnian Ingathering Project, suggests that post-

conflict reconstruction has taken on a colonial nature. His experiences in Bosnia and

Kosovo exposed a "horror-show because organizational volunteers had little or no

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[20] Kaiser, Colin. 2002. Chef de Bureau, UNESCO, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Telephone Survey.
15 October.

expertise but wielded power and money so that it appeared like a bad colonial

administration" (Riedlmayer pers. comm. 07-02-02).[21]

Such 'colonization' can be further distinguished between 'hard' top-down projects

with funding provided by the EU and World Bank for roads, sewers, communication

lines, bridges, schools, hospitals, and pre-fabricated housing projects, and 'soft' social

engineering, bottom-up projects with funding provided by NGO and special interest

groups (Pugh 1998). Hitherto, the two arms of peace building have been preoccupied

with rebuilding material, economic, and social infrastructure, at the expense of a full

understanding of cultural attachment to symbolic place. Canada has developed a high-

level of sophistication for understanding multi-cultural environments and could play a

leading role in promoting culturally sensitive post-conflict reconstruction activities in

Afghanistan.

The discourse of NGO and UN post-conflict reconstruction reports imply that

post-conflict reconstruction has often been inappropriate because of ethnic tensions, cost,

design elements, building materials, donor agendas, and expertise. Both the IC response

time and post-conflict reconstruction project length have become part of the discourse of

post-conflict reconstruction literature,[22] because so often, the repatriation of IDPs and

refugees hinges upon reconstruction projects. The international community involved in

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[21] Riedlmayer is certain that the high corruption levels in the Balkans do not only emanate from the local mafias that Kaiser suggests, but more so from "the international organizations and non-governmental organizations because locals are totally dependent on these aid volunteers, and these volunteers become corrupted and power despots" (Riedlmayer pers. comm. 07-02-02).

[22] Other reports that build an argument for sensitive third-party intervention in post-war situations include country-to-country comparisons, such as *Post-conflict reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua* by Patricia Ardon, and others which use specific case studies, such as *Settlement Reconstruction After War: Towards Improved Shelter and Environment for Refugees and Displaced Persons within the Post-Yugoslav Countries*, edited by Sultan Barakat and Sue Ellis, and *Settlement Reconstruction Post-War, and Post-conflict reconstruction & Conservation in Croatia*, both produced by the Post-conflict reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) at the University of York.

post-conflict reconstruction have few ways of coping with the complexity of modern emergencies (Lederach 1997; Rubin 1998; Monteville 1990).

The process of reconstructing culture begins with salvaging the elements of vernacular life; that which is familiar and comfortable. This creates a temporal and spatial familiarity. Next, cultural performance is enhanced and strengthened as people feel encouraged by their familiar surroundings to ritualize, pray, and break bread. Daily repetition builds continuity, and identity and culture can be shored up in the process.[23]

Clearly, cultural landscapes are significant to post-conflict reconstruction as cultures and identities are contested, privileged, and grounded within landscapes in post-conflict environments.

Conclusion

Culture and its 'canvas' - the cultural landscape - are regularly left to be reconstructed by whoever is able to pay for reconstruction and who does not shrink from the 'messy' political and cultural tensions that may ensue with rebuilding. This leaves significant reconstruction and/or 'construction' opportunities for partisan and sectarian agencies seeking to manifest their power in the landscape. As well, the IC thinks it knows what Afghanis need and this could turn out to be incorrect. Priorities set by agenda-driven donor agencies fall short of addressing social issues inherent in war-torn societies and cater to outside interests, not to indigenous needs.

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[23] According to architectural theorist, Andrew Herscher, there are special problems in the rebuilding of post-war architecture. When a community undergoes the ravages of war, its sense of identity alters. Physical elements, like buildings and bridges, take on different meanings after war, due to their destruction, damage, and their significance to new citizens. Objects of significance before the war may hold none afterwards because of drastically changed local demographics, new ideologies, and re-prioritization.

Colin Kaiser describes how the international community in Bosnia used a backwards looking approach to build capacities, rather than looking forward and assisting locals to building new future capacities:

> It's trying somehow to efface something that has happened with military and semi-military means. Everything is time-bound, time-bound not in function of the destruction but time-bound to the period before; hence turning the clock back. This is the first time. This is the first war in essence that we say… "let's restore their lives." So we are looking at what's been done, and we hope to wipe out what was done [during the war]. I don't think we have really done this anywhere. The international community, and this means for Bosnia, unfortunately, is like a big experiment and we actually don't think enough about what we're doing and whether we can do it, we just go on and do it (Kaiser pers. comm. 15-10-02).

Strengthening elements of culture, ethnicity, religion, heritage and identity are missing in post-conflict reconstruction strategies promoted by members of the international community.[24]

Kaiser supports the argument that there is little understanding in the field of post-conflict reconstruction of the link between people and their places:

> The challenge is enormous, because the question is that we have not thought out what we are reconstructing. I'm involved in an effort – we are involved here - with the reconstruction of a country. It's not just the aspects of physical reconstruction, which are very important. There are aspects of institutional reconstruction, there are aspects of democratization, there is the whole problem of are we also reconstructing a society. What are we doing? Are we reconstructing, putting back into place, a multi-cultural heritage, and those things all sort of enter into this. The question is what are we reconstructing, right? (Kaiser pers. comm. 15-10-02).

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[24] "All this must be internal, there must be internal dynamics in all kinds of cultural reconstruction; otherwise there will be no reconstruction. It will be more demolition of local capacities" (Kaiser, Colin. 2002. Chef de Bureau, UNESCO, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Telephone Survey. 15 October).

Sultan Barakat of the Post-conflict reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York in the UK, suggests that "reconstruction should be seen as the first step in a long-term recovery process. Although generally perceived as the physical rebuilding of destroyed settlements, that really is only one aspect of a much broader process of dealing with war and its aftermath. Reconstruction involves integrated activities and processes that have to be initiated in order to 'kick start' the development process interrupted by war" (Barakat 1998:1). Yet, the locals do not benefit enough from the current practices of post war reconstruction. The locals have little control over the development of the landscape in which they will live (Craig pers. comm. 16-08-02).

The IC must become more concerned with the value and significance of place in order to offer some level of protection to the relationships that people have with such places. Appadurai (2001:19) argues that the only way to move forward as a community is to place the future, rather than past, at the heart of thinking about culture. Such a shift would reframe what and why specific elements of indigenous culture are important and how these will figure into the future. The IC should empower communities in building their cultural capacities, with less priority placed on reconstructing the past, and a stronger focus on constructing a cultural future.

SYSTEMS OF MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

The sciences have struggled with proving causality. As such, it is no small thing to ask the professions of defence, diplomacy, and development to easily draw up a system by which to measure the cause and effect relationships inherent in the activities in which they implement in post-conflict contexts. Proving causality becomes even more complex when it is human systems that are the focus of measurement.

From a broad perspective, the problem of discerning effectiveness is identical with the problem of establishing causality. Further, the critical issue in evaluation is therefore whether or not an activity has produced more of an effect than would have occurred without the activity, or compared with alternative interventions.[25] In other words, if a program or activity or intervention had not occurred at all, would the eventual outcome be the same or different?

Some post-conflict reconstruction activities seem to naturally lend themselves to what we think of as 'easy' evaluations of progress – that is, some activities have easily quantifiable goals and are easier to measure. These include 'hard' post-conflict reconstruction activities like roads, rail tracks, and power plants and counting numbers of people, numbers of kilometres, and project budget allocations, amongst others.

Alternatively, most post-conflict reconstruction activities consist of 'softer' goals, which appear more difficult to measure. These activities involve people and consequences. To further problematize the measuring process, there exists no adequate system within fields of development, social sciences, or hard sciences by which to adequately measure social and cultural impacts on humans over time. To make matters worse, there is no technology currently put to this task.

Nevertheless, it remains critical to examine post-conflict reconstruction activities no matter how difficult it appears to measure their effectiveness. Applying a cohesive, inter-operable measuring system to this problematic will ensure adequate resources, connections between the 3-D actors, and will most likely result in positive impacts upon stakeholders in the short and long-term in Afghanistan. By systemizing an approach now,

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[25] Evaluation: A systematic approach. P.163.

the CF will be able to develop it over time and apply the system to other post-conflict theatres of operation of which combat operations are not the only activity.

Although the CF will be applying their own well-defined MOE systems to the 'hard' components of their security mandate that are combat-related, the task at hand is to identify the effectiveness of 'soft' post-conflict reconstruction projects and activities in Afghanistan, and to observe progress throughout the five-year mandate as well as through each short-term rotation.

Impacts, or effectiveness, are difficult phenomena to measure and are less tied to quantitative realities than they are to qualitative ones. In the end, there is no way to eliminate subjective judgment from assessing qualitative measurements of effectiveness. It is critical, therefore, to apply a disciplined evaluation of results to provide meaningful feedback.

Measuring effectiveness in a post-conflict reconstruction environment is not meant to be a mechanistic process and must, inherently, rely on the judgment of people in theatre. It is important, though, to provide a well-designed mechanism by which these people can rely, and one that is transferable between theatres and deployments and is the framework that provides consistent measuring over time.

Current Trends in Measuring Systems

Many industries apply results-based measuring to their work. It is usually employed as a tool to gauge the impact of spending and resource allocation over a period of time in a particular program or activity. The tool uses both quantitative and qualitative data for formal reporting. 'Results' are describable or measurable changes resulting from cause-and-effect relationships. A result can be 'developmental' (impact in the project

country for the recipient population) or 'operational'[26] (impact of the project within the agency or for the donor). Therefore, results-based measuring examines changes through time of multiple and often complex relationships between inputs and outputs. Results are not end states, but rather can be considered as variations in behaviour and performance during a process. Figure 1 illustrates a typical results-based measurement system.

Input →	Activity →	Output →	Outcome →	Impact
Resources	Program or Project	Immediate measurable consequences	Short-term effect of activity	Long-term effect or consequence of activity

Figure 1 Results-Based Measuring

The basic aim of impact assessments and measuring effectiveness is to estimate the net effects or net outcomes of an intervention. Net effects or net outcomes are those results attributable to the intervention, free and clear of the effects of other elements present in the situation under evaluation.[27]

In 1996, CIDA adopted results-based management as its main management tool for measuring how, why, when, where, and for whom it was spending Canadian tax dollars and who was benefiting from the expenditures. It adopted the new system to improve the impact of its work and to achieve increased efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in achieving that impact.

CIDAs system of results-based management aims to:

- Define realistic expected results, based on appropriate analyses;

- Clearly identify program beneficiaries and design programs to meet their needs;

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[26] Please note that military language has been co-opted by many professions, including the development sector. The term 'operational' refers, in this case, to the effects of an activity in mission area to the agencies and donors that supported the event.
[27] Evaluation: A systematic approach. p163.

- Monitor progress towards results and resources consumed, with the use of appropriate indicators;

- Identify and manage risks, while bearing in mind expected results and the necessary resources;

- Increase knowledge by learning lessons and integrating them into decisions; and

- Report on results achieved and the resources involved.[28]

In addition to CIDA, other development agencies use RBM to measure success. For example, ECHO applied a results-based measuring system to its Humanitarian Intervention Plans in Afghanistan between 2002-2003.[29] This system, however, continues to be redeveloped because it does not capture the required levels of granularity or relevance for future planning, as shown in Figure 2.

Planned	Indicators	Comments
To save and preserve life during the Afghan emergency and its aftermath as well as natural disasters in Afghanistan that have entailed major loss of life, physical, psychological, or social suffering or material damage.	Persons benefited from ECHO assistance	Figures calculated for the Team in Kabul estimated 7 705 690 beneficiaries, not all of which would have been in mortal danger. There is, no doubt, an element of double counting since 7 million out of a population of 25 million seems unrealistic. Nevertheless, the scale of ECHO's beneficiaries is very substantial.

Figure 2 A 'Results Table'[30]

Performance measuring employs a robust system of qualitative and quantitative data to assess and review targets based on status of projects at a particular assessment

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[28] CIDA. 1996. *Results-Based Management in CIDA – Policy Statement*. Prepared by Results-Based Management Division, Performance Review Branch. March.

[29] Channel Research. 2004. *Evaluation of ECHO's Humanitarian Intervention Plans in Afghanistan and Assessment of ECHOs Future Strategy in Afghanistan with Reference to Actions in Iran and Pakistan*. ECHO. June.

[30] This table has been modified from the version appearing in *Evaluation of ECHO's Humanitarian Intervention Plans in Afghanistan and Assessment of ECHOs Future Strategy in Afghanistan with Reference to Actions in Iran and Pakistan*. ECHO. June 2004.

date. It aims to compare actual results with those that were expected or targeted. It serves

as a connection between the results of an activity and the priorities of relevant

stakeholders.

This system also indicates direct connections between planned and unplanned

activity results, or in other words, intended and unintended consequences, both positive

and negative. Those involved in post-conflict reconstruction or long-term development

refer to this system as 'performance monitoring plans' that are built on a foundation of

'implementation planning.' 'Performance reporting' is a result of the data embedded in

performance monitoring plans.

Figure 3 shows the process of performance measurement:

Figure 3 The Performance Measurement Process

Performance

Performance

Performance

If a program's goals, objectives and performance indicators have been carefully

constructed, then measurement will be a relatively mechanical process. However,

because there is no way to completely eliminate subjective judgment from any decision-

making process, measurement must rely upon an agreed-upon system or stakeholder

consensus. Regardless of the clarity of a performance indicator, there may be varying

interpretations of the degree of achievement. This variation may be minimized by careful

wording of the performance indicators, but will probably never completely eliminate

varying opinions.[31]Moreover, any sophisticated form of measuring human conditions, or 'soft' indicators, becomes impossible due to the complex nature of human relationships, psychologies, and unknown consequences of activity impacts. Yet, stakeholders continue to try to measure these variables. A typical performance measurement plan is shown in Figure 4.

Target →	Baseline →	Indicators →	Actual →	Review
End State or performance expectations	Conditions existing at outset of an activity	Performance, Quantitative, and Qualitative	Assessment, Monitoring, and Reporting of actual end state	Comprehensive overview

Figure 4 Performance Measurement Plan

The various post-conflict sectors, such as security sector, governance, judicial, civil society, commerce/trade, etc. and their key activities for post-conflict reconstruction typically use performance indicator measuring systems, by which activity targets/projections are compared with actual project status. This type of reporting has a low level of granularity and methodologically, it can be a flawed practice.

As well, due to a lack of coherent measuring system for post-conflict reconstruction activities, targets and status are often recorded at the same time and any major discrepancy inherent between the two can easily be mitigated through *ad hoc* reporting systems. For example, an agency awarded a major contract for reconstructing basic infrastructure can report that there was a "lack of security in sector B, therefore sector B road was not completed". Yet, there is no way to examine whether or not there was indeed a lack of security in sector B because reporting is not cross-checked with defence reporting systems. There is no clear way to determine whether or not the

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[31] Hatfield, Jerry M. 1994. Developing Performance Measures For Criminal Justice Programs. Assessment And Evaluation: Handbook Series No. 2. US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance State Reporting and Evaluation Program, February.

reporting reflects reality. Figure 5 employs the 'time unit' approach and illustrates the

target-status model.

Performance Measure	Sept. 30, 2004 Target	Sept. 30, 2004 Actual
Schools Constructed	517 schools	39 schools completed, 230 under construction and under renovation
Teachers trained	14,500	7,900
Students enrolled	170,000	169,716

Figure 5 *Ad hoc* **Performance Measuring**[32]

Another widely used system of measuring is known as "measures of

effectiveness" (MOEs). It is also called effects-based measuring, and is an evaluation

process, which measures impacts of actions on identified stakeholder groups. It does

allow for qualitative data analysis, but is most often applied to evaluating quantitative

data, such as numbers of people, type and quantities of supplies/money, and time, as

illustrated in Figure 6.

Project	Measures of Effectiveness	Impacts
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)	42,300 soldiers demobilized in 17 months	Reduced number of trained men with weapons.
	39,121 light weapons registered and destroyed in 18.5 months	Stabilization of security environment.
	11,008 ex-combatants re-trained and reintegrated in communities of origin	Strengthening of local economies through retraining and new forms of employment.

Figure 6 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Measures of Effectiveness

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[32] This table has been modified from the version appearing in "Appendix III: Sector Level Performance Indicators: Table 11: Education Sector Measures Reported to Afghanistan Operations Group in FY 2004," in GAO. 2005. *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continues to Threaten Achievement of US Goals.* GAO-05-742. July.

If the measuring system is uniform within an organization or agency, it allows for

comparisons across organizational programs, program categories, and implementing

actors.

Effects-based measuring tends to over-simplify qualitative data and narrative

approaches to phenomena. Figure 7 illustrates this system.

Projects	Type/Level of Issue Addressed	Potential Impacts
DDR	Militias provide the only means of a livelihood for many young men (bottom up incentives). Commanders/war lords need fighters to control political and economic resources (top down incentives). Decentralized violence means that fighters are afraid to disarm.	Creation of alternative livelihoods for fighters. Increased security likely to attract additional funding for reconstruction and undermine the power of war lords.

Figure 7 A simple effects-based approach to DDR[33]

For clarification purposes, it is important to note the distinction between effects-

based operations and effects-based measurement. Effects-based operations (EBO) is a

planning methodology for the conduct of military operations. The US, UK, and NATO

are currently adopting this planning process. The concept of EBO is not new and is based

on an historical military tradition of shaping the will of an adversary. EBO is most

effective in its adaptation of network centric warfare, technological and real time

communications linking all aspects of war fighting into a shared situational awareness

and shared understanding of command intent so as to achieve a unity and synchronicity

of effects that multiplies the power of military forces.[34] This planning methodology

maximizes efficiency and minimizes wasted efforts in the pursuit of goals.[35] EBO is

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[33] The following information has been modified from DFID. 2004. *Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Afghanistan.* Evaluation Report EV 647. p.28.

[34] Smith, Edward A. 2002. Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War. The Command and Control Research Program. Department of Defense. pp. 61-62.

[35] Lowe, Donald and Simon Ng. 2004. *Effects-based operations: language, meaning and the effects-based approach.* A paper presented at the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Defence Science and Technology Organisation. Canberra, Australia.

intended to influence the thinking and behaviour of an adversary in order to reach an envisioned effect.[36]

In theory, there exist some commonalities between EBO planning for military operations and the measuring of effectiveness in post-conflict reconstruction environments. This includes the vertical and horizontal requirement for information sharing. As with EBOs, successful MOEs must be supported by a holistic and integrated command and control structure that is capable of understanding the conflict environment as a complex system of systems.[37]

Photo Archiving as a Measurement Tool

Although not considered a mainstream measurement tool, photo archiving of reconstruction activities is a powerful way to capture progress. During the post-conflict reconstruction of the Bridge of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) tasked with reconstructing this culturally important site created a digital photo archive of reconstruction progress over time. The PCU uploaded the photo database to a publicly available web-based system. Viewers can scroll through the photo thumbnails and see the building of the bridge. Sometimes the photo series shows little progress, while other series show strong forward progress in short bursts of time.

Photo archiving requires little specialized training and is relatively objective compared to the more subjective measurement tools used in the industry. As well, photo archiving cannot be disputed or manipulated, as can traditional text-based reporting tools, and is a powerful way for communities to remember.

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[36] Hoang, LTC Ho How. 2004. *Effects-Based Operations Equals to "Shock And Awe"?*

[37] Grossman-Vermaas, Robert. 2003(?) *The Effects-based concept, MNE 3 and NMOs: an experimental analysis*. Department of National Defence. Operational Research Division
National Defence Headquarters: Ottawa, Canada

MOE Challenges Experienced within the International Community

USAID

In the most recent US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report,

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other

Obstacles Continues to Threaten Achievement of US Goals (July 2005), there is a marked

need to better assess progress toward achieving government policy goals and to provide a

basis for planning future reconstruction. There are significant parallels with the GOC

mandate, such as an accountability requirement to analyze the progress and management

of Canadian assistance, services, mechanisms, and funds; and, to identify major factors

obstructing advancement of the efforts in Afghanistan and the achievement of Canadian

policy goals.

The first GAO recommendation was for the establishment of a performance

management plan and that all sub-agencies be required to use the same form of

performance management plan. It was also recommended that there be put in place a

more complete communication process of relaying performance information from the

field to decision-makers in Washington.[38] Similar to Canada, there exists no consolidated

financial or progress reporting mechanism that tracks obligations and expenditures. There

is no way to assess real costs, only targeted expenditures. This impacts sound planning in

the medium and long-term commitment to Afghanistan.

It was discovered that the primary implementing agency, USAID (equivalent to

CIDA) cannot develop a complete and accurate assessment of the status of its assistance

efforts in Afghanistan without a measurement plan that meets the requirements set out by

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[38] GAO. 2005. *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continues to Threaten Achievement of US Goals*. GAO-05-742. July.

the government (GAO, 2005:45). In fact, due to weaknesses in field reporting and the lack of a performance management system, the information reported by USAID to decision makers in Washington did not accurately portray the status of each sector or the overall assistance efforts. Numbers of buildings completed, kilometers of roads refurbished, and other tangible, quantitative results were easily relayed, but other somewhat intangible results were not easily relayed. By not having a relevant or useful measuring system for stakeholders to use in the field, the funding agent (USAID) could not determine if primary objectives were being met and to what standards. The report has motivated USAID to create a new measuring system, which will be released in fiscal 2006.

The result has been that decision makers in Washington and Kabul cannot effectively target resources to accomplish the goal of creating a stable Afghan Society (GAO, 2005:64).

Each sector of post-conflict reconstruction has inherent indicators for success. Agriculture indicators are not comparable to judicial indicators and the time scale at which these indicators are measured are not inter-operable. Moreover, those stakeholders/contractors working in particular sectors have different expectations of reporting and measuring and thus cannot be relied upon to produce adequate and timely performance or result measurements. As well, each department has a different measuring expectation of its sub-agencies, and some departments do not expect performance measuring whatsoever.

World Bank

Even the World Bank (WB) has difficulty measuring outcomes in its country assistance programs. The WB uses a system of measuring called Country Assistance

Evaluation (CAE) methodology, which evaluates the outcomes of Bank assistance

programs not clients' overall development progress. According to reports, the CAEs

evaluate only the outcome of the Bank's program, not the client's overall development

outcome, although, the WB suggests that the latter is clearly relevant for judging program

outcomes and relevance. Ambiguous language is used in WB evaluations, including the

ratings of 'satisfactory' and 'unsatisfactory' to their project outcomes. This inappropriate

and subjective typology negatively impacts the relevancy of measuring.

The Department for International Development

In 2004, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) released a

report, *Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools, Country Case Study 2: Afghanistan*

Study. Due to the extraordinarily high number of competing actors, projects, and related

activities, DFID required an evaluation of its work to examine the design, implementation

and impact of selected programmes in order to learn lessons from them so that these

could be applied to current and future work and to help strengthen the government's

accountability (DFID, 2004:iv).

Again, the extraordinary number of actors and projects allowed are only for a

macro evaluation. As well, their analysis was not systematic or conclusive because it was

done after the fact and was based upon an *ad hoc* performance measuring system that was

not inter-operable. The report concluded that in order to adequately learn lessons and

apply them to current and future work, there would necessitate more consistent

approaches to assessment and priority setting; more determined pursuit of coordinated

responses; and a clearer allocation of resources and personnel trained in assessment.

DFID has identified that there are hurdles to cross in relation to inter-operable

systems of assessment between the departments involved in the UK 'joined up' approach,

equivalent to the Canadian 3D approach in Afghanistan. There is a need for a mechanism to ensure that joined up analysis systematically informs strategy development and programming (DFID, 2004:3). In addition to this, evaluation and monitoring benchmarks need to be established and should be realistic and appropriate to the Afghan context. Time frames have been found to be unrealistic and inappropriate. DFID identified a need to systematically monitor and mitigate the negative impacts of projects (DFID, 2004:4).

Lastly, DFID required improved benchmarks, targets, and indicators for consideration, which take into account evolving circumstances. "The Afghan conflict is a 'moving target' and therefore conflict analysis and indicators need to be continually updated and adapted" (DFID 2004:43).

Recently, DFID has identified a need for an additional layer of bureaucracy to manage the joined up approach to post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. This could, potentially, create its own challenges and complexities rather than simplifying the problem, not to mention the expense attributed to such an agenda.

Most systems of measuring post-conflict reconstruction are methodologically flawed for the following reasons:

- Systems oversimplify complex human conditions and tend to promote a false sense of over-confidence in implementers; analysis of impacts takes time and thoughtfulness – and these luxuries are often remit in post-conflict reconstruction environments;

- Impacts are difficult to measure because they occur over a long period of time;

- Targeting outputs and probable outcomes simplifies the human condition being observed;

- Identifying impacts and consequences is a subjective process;

- There is no MOE training for personnel to target outputs and probable outcomes;

- Cause-effect chains cannot be traced in linear fashion;

- There exist no real indicators or baseline data to begin the measuring process;

- There is no evidenced systematic analysis of positive and negative effects of projects;

- Current systems of measurement do not compensate for personnel rotations and therefore cannot reflect adequate evaluations over time.

There is much ambiguity in and between program evaluation systems. Often, terms and their meanings are interchanged with one another; for example, the most common mistakes interchange the terms *outputs*, *outcomes*, *targets*, *results,* and *effects.* These, though, are not interchangeable and to use them as such compromises the methodological foundations of the measuring process and confuses evaluation of activities and reporting such evaluations.

Moreover, because there is no simple measuring mechanism for deployments and field work, data compiled is not complete, is not inter-operable, and there are variations in frequency of reporting, which result in a disconnection between decision makers, the 3-D stakeholders, and ultimately, the CF mandate in Afghanistan.

THE ONTOLOGICAL DIVIDE

During the research process a series of conversations were recorded between the primary researcher and other theorists. The following points were summarized throughout this process and are presented here to focus attention on the ontological divide between traditional military thinking and the new post-conflict reconstruction theatre in which the military is asked to operate.

Discussion 1

Positivism is based on inputs and outputs and is an efficient way to score and measure, but it does not cross over the ontological divide of military instrumentalism to hermeneutics,[39] which is what we really do need to employ in measuring progress in Afghanistan. The essences of quality of life in the recipient population, the essence of place and practiced life are the bases of the questions to ask if we are to bridge this ontological gap.

Militaries are, by nature, instrumentalist and bureaucratic. The CF is being deployed to a country that thinks in 'generations' and not in five-year windows of time. This will become problematic in that such a context is not instrumentalist by nature because in Afghanistan we are dealing with a different type of problem in a different type of world which, logically, requires a different ontology. Based on this ontological shift, it follows that new methods and strategies based on qualitative inquiry would be the result.

We need to be assessing narratives about space and place and the recovery and stability of a federated community of multiple tribes and clans rather than answers and

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[39] Hermeneutics is a branch of philosophy concerned with human understanding and the interpretation of texts. Texts need not be written documents; for example, speech, performances, works of art, and even events can be considered *texts*. The word *hermeneutics* has two derivations. One is from the Greek god Hermes as patron of communication and human understanding, while the other is from the Egyptian deity Hermes Trismegistus in his role as representing hidden or secret knowledge. The word Hermeneutic means *interpretive*.

outputs. This 'hermeneutical' approach includes non-ending narratives rather than scores and measures; as well as identifying soft-indicators of powerful values rather than a measurement system. Such systems are linear in nature, and post-conflict reconstruction is a non-linear activity. The powerful nuances of culture, place, and identity can only be expressed through qualitative enquiry but is this what the military really wants?

We will need to discard typical, and outmoded, indicators as defined by the international community and allow indigenous populations to identify their own indicators and measures of progress. A balance of 'semantic differentiation' coupled with qualitative sensitive questions will be required to observe change over time.

The CF troops are psychologically, emotionally, and spiritually developed but they require more training for purposes of measuring progress in Afghanistan. Currently, they are not yet able to be 'participant observers' as understood through ethnographic enquiry. For example, soldiers are not prepared to understand how they move through public and private spaces; or how to observe indigenous cultures and publics; yet the nature of post-conflict reconstruction is to stabilize not only a security environment, as well as the larger context of the cultural landscape in which the security environment exists. From an ethnographic perspective, we need to observe whether or not the security presence is alienating; if they feel like they need to carry a weapon all of the time; if they have been asked to have tea or break bread; if they have made an indigenous friend. To understand culture is to observe non-traditional, non-linear narratives of cultures, places, and identities.

Not all CF should be participant observers, but a few key informed personnel will need to be identified as primary observers or 'lead correspondents.' They will be the

people reacting to the questions, which may require training to make the ontological shift from military instrumentalism to hermeneutics.

The main problem remains that the context of Afghanistan, and in particular Kandahar province, is significantly complex and this requires a different analysis procedure. Ethnography is a powerful tool that is equal to statistical analysis.

Discussion 2

The most important question to ask is what are we measuring? It could be said that we are measuring progress of CF activities according to the campaign plan. We are also measuring progress of our activities and not necessarily the progress of the indigenous populations in moving towards perceived national goals.

The system of measurement must support a change in personnel every 6 months, based on the rotations in and out of theatre. The system itself would be the backbone that remains consistent throughout each rotation. The PRT has been placed in a front-line province that consists of ethnically 'Pashtun' tribes, therefore it is critical that we do not template Bosnia's framework of analysis onto Afghanistan. We cannot be mechanistic, but need to strike a balance somewhere between the universal approaches – such as mission implementation plans (MIP) – and non-cookie cutter approaches.

The measurement system needs to integrate, or nest into, the mission plan. Identification of what the CF is required to measure will influence the design of the process. Because most soldiers in the PRT will be operating under extreme stress and fatigue, the design of the measurement tool cannot be too open-ended. Suggestions include adding a 'laundry list' or check list that includes cultural elements that could be 'looked for' in the mission context; an aide memoire on 'what to look for' or 'what to observe' would be a handy tool; questions must be robust; it must have simplicity across

disciplines; and last but most importantly, a training element must be built into the process. This will allow for a sense of trust or faith in those doing the day-to-day observing by the data analysts. Therefore the questions must be simple enough to be dummy-proofed for field observation but sophisticated enough that the analysts can glean substantial conclusions of progress from the data collected by these people.

There is a significant difference between outputs and outcomes. Macro outcomes, both short and long-term, need to be captured, even if they are at a low level of granularity and are 'fuzzy.' A well-designed system will provide a means of monitoring over time. There is a requirement for long-term observation, even after Canada has left Afghanistan, which includes a periodic visit structure. This will insure that Canada-led projects are measured over a longer period of time to truly attain a sense of their impact on indigenous populations. We currently have no adequate system of measuring capacity building, so it is incumbent upon Canada to observe the outcomes of our work in the long run.

Discussion 3

Measures of effectiveness always need to be connected to the campaign plan. The practical method is to recognize 'gains' and 'losses' and most deployments use a system that does just that. Yet, there is an *ad hoc* approach to MOEs with each deployment and during each deployment with each rotation. Within the military, there is a marked avoidance of qualitative processes, and a reliance upon only quantifiable data. However, this does not necessarily feed into the mandate in Afghanistan. CIMIC teams do have a sense of quality of life of people.

At the beginning of a mission 'indicators' must be broad-based, but as the mission continues, these indicators need to be drilled down to the micro level. MOEs must be at a

fine level of granularity and the five senses need to be employed by those doing the observing in order to capture nuances. Yet, the design of such a system cannot be onerous. It needs to make mission life easier and is clearly seen as a way to shape operations for the positive.

There is much misunderstanding of Effects-Based Operations but the fact remains that it is a *prediction* system, not a *post-activity* measurement system. EBOs are measures in advance or projections, rather than measures after activities have already been implemented.

Discussion 4

What are the elements of society that are eroded during conflict and how does the international community step in to support/strengthen these elements? The traditional approach considers the post-conflict situation to be acceptable as long at there is an absence of conflict, which necessarily frames measures of mission effectiveness one particular way. Yet there is a requirement to monitor the health of the key elements of an effective society, such as functioning government institutions like justice, education, health, police, etc. which are part of a broader human security perspective significant in all civil society elements - free press, fair markets, sustainable (financially and ecologically) employment, and open schools, for example. This broader framework leads to the real/macro/outcome measures, which include a sense of security, trust in government institutions, and confidence in the future. In fact, if this broader framework is deconstructed, there are three primary indicators of success: faith, hope and trust. This is a long way from the normal areas the CF pays attention to. It may be unreasonable to develop good direct measures for current use, because the CF may not be able to make this ontological shift.

MEASURING PROGRESS IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Purpose

The MOE system presented in this document was designed for three purposes:

1. To be distinct from CF combat operations measurement systems (MOEs);
2. To be relevant, cohesive, and coherent for the 3-D actors and could eventually become inter-operable with other systems of measurement; and
3. To be a living document that remains flexible.

This MOE system ensures that CF personnel continue moving towards the realization of clearly defined goals.[40] If the MOE system is consistently employed over time and remains flexible to changing requirements and environments, it could potentially motivate and empower personnel to maximize their contributions, remain focused on objectives, and ultimately reduce the time and cost of reaching objectives. This MOE system will ensure the transfer of information between rotations and will illustrate accomplishments through general progress reporting. This supports a clear, value-added reporting tool for other GOC actors. As well, it is designed to capture the intended and unintended consequences of the GOC commitment to Afghanistan.

It is critical to note that the content of this observation system is intended as the first phase of a multi-phased process of development by the CF. This phase should not be viewed as the final stage of measuring effectiveness in post-conflict reconstruction. It should be added to and developed as the CF continues to work in post-conflict reconstruction within the ever-changing context of global peace and security.

The system was designed to measure progress and effectiveness of post-conflict reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, and incorporates the following critical elements:

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[40] Please note that within the field of effectiveness measuring, goals are referred to as 'targets' as described in the *Ad Hoc Performance Measuring* table on p. 24 of the project Framing Document. The meaning of 'targets' as 'objectives' or 'goals' is distinct from that used by the CF.

1. User-friendly
2. High-level of granularity
3. Blends quantitative and qualitative data
4. Accommodates daily assessments in real-time
5. Inter-operable
6. Visually-based
7. Flexible
8. Holistic and inclusive
9. For CF commanders for CF purposes.

Parts

There are three distinct parts to the MOE system. They are: i) the granularity plan; ii) frequency; and iii) the observation plan. The following sections correspond with these three parts.

(i) Post-Conflict Reconstruction Granularity Plan

Specificity and clarity are the keys to maximizing the measurability of performance indicators and in achieving inter-operability for different actors and stakeholders. If the following questions are considered in the planning process, a baseline is created according to which future work will be measured:

1. Who will be responsible for the activity? This question will focus on which actors and organizations will perform which functions.

2. What exactly will be attempted? A good test for this question is whether or not the indicator is understandable by someone not familiar with the program. It should be clear enough for personnel to perform the task with little or no further information.

3. When, or over what period of time, will an action take place? A graphic illustration of a milestone chart will help personnel to visualize when various actions will occur, and will serve as a useful tool in program accountability.

4. How much time is allocated to a particular activity? This allows for some measure of relative efficiency and could lead to cost- and time-effectiveness measures.

5. How, or by what methods, will an activity occur? There are many methods, which can be used to achieve the same results. Which methods will be employed?

6. Where will an activity occur?

7. Why will an activity occur? Although this question will do little to increase measurability, its inclusion helps to further define a program and allow personnel to see the macro view of the mandate in Afghanistan. If an indicator statement ends "in order to..." it offers personnel a reason to do something and adds some degree of clarity.

8. How will change be evidenced? Measuring? Counting? Describing? Narrating? What are the parameters for these quantitative and qualitative approaches to measuring change? It is better to incorporate a blend of quantitative and qualitative methods, which can promote better reporting.

9. When will change be evidenced? Designating a time allotment for phases of an activity (micro-activities) will empower the personnel in the field and they will see goal attainment, no matter how small in the big picture of things.

10. Who will effect the change? Identifying the actors, especially elements of the recipient populations that contribute to change should be noted.

11. Who will the changes effect? List the key recipients of changes associated with activities.

12. Is there an untoward result, impact, or effect anticipated through the micro-activities associated with an activity? This should include the forecasting of negative consequences attributed to activities.

When these questions are answered, the next step is to complete a baseline document.

The level of granularity required to generate relevant measurement evaluations is based

upon a system of dis-aggregation. Identifying layers, actors, and activities provides

critical baseline information. Each of the following disaggregated levels requires

identification before measuring can begin.

Levels:

Country
   → Region
     → Sector
       → Actors
         → Project(s)/Program(s)
           → Activity/Activities
             → Micro-Activities
               → Immediate Recipients/Stakeholders
                 → Long-term Recipients/Stakeholders

To serve this purpose, a post-conflict reconstruction activity planning system was

designed to support the MOE system and is shown in Figure 8 Post-Conflict

Reconstruction Granularity Plan. Because all actors involved in post-conflict

reconstruction require a particular level of granularity to measure progress and

effectiveness, the PCR Granularity Plan will systematically support each activity and link

its purposes to the greater mission plan. Understanding the aggregates of CF and non-CF

post-conflict activities will be an important step for inter-departmental and intra-

governmental communication.

Figure 8 Post-Conflict Reconstruction Granularity Plan

DISAGGREGATION	DESCRIPTION		
Country			
Region			
Sector			
Lines of Operation			
Decisive Point			
Actors (3-D, local, etc.)			
Task			
Target Start Date		Target End Date	
Sub-Task			
Target Start Date		Target End Date	
Purpose			
Milestones			
Target Short-term Stakeholders			
Target Short-Term Recipients			
Target Long-term Stakeholders			
Target Long-term Recipients			
Negative and Positive impacts			

(ii) Frequency

There is an advantage to performing frequent assessments of activities. They provide decision-makers with an opportunity to observe exactly what allows for and prevents achievement of objectives, and permits for small adjustments during the fulfillment of an activity, rather than larger adjustments after an activity has missed its target objective. Although it is not realistic for CF personnel deployed to Afghanistan to observe the effectiveness of their activities on a *daily* basis, this system works to its full potential as a systematic employment at regular intervals.

(iii) Observation System[41]

The measurement plan employs a real-time, flexible, visually-based observation system that incorporates quantitative and qualitative analysis through participant observations and contributes to the advancement of the campaign.

These are preliminary progress measurement questions PCP has constructed from the limited knowledge of the CF PCR projects and activities that support the decisive points in the sector areas. It is anticipated that these questions will provide a baseline that will be continuously contributed to by CF personnel. It is suggested that the personnel responsible for CF PCR have freedom to develop questions based on field realities.[42] This will contribute to the continued flexibility of this MOE system.

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[41] For observation purposes the term Afghani is used throughout this system and is meant to include all publics within the borders of present-day Afghanistan.
[42] This notion is reflected in the instructional notes at the front of the Field Message Book included as part of this project.

The Observation Plan consists of seven parts. They are:

Part 1 Activity-Specific Evaluation Questions
Part 2 Open-Ended Questions
Part 3 General Progress Questions
Part 4 Sector-Specific Progress Evaluation Questions
Part 5 Culture Check List
Part 6 Observer Information
Part 7 Miscellaneous

PART 1
ACTIVITY-SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTIONS

	Very Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good
1. I would rate our interactions with Afghanis as					
2. I would rate Afghani interest in this activity as					
3. I would rate Afghani support of this activity as					
4. I would rate our understanding of this activity as					
5. I would rate our understanding of Afghanis as					
6. I would rate other actors support in this activity as					
7. I would rate the anticipated outcome of this project as					
Totals					
Score					

Part 2
OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

1. The thing that happened today that was different was:

2. I think this activity helps other activities such as:

3. I think this activity hinders other activities such as:

4. The recommendations that would improve this activity are:

5. Afghanis have suggested that this activity is:

PART 3
GENERAL PROGRESS QUESTIONS

	Worse than before (-1)	**Same as before (0)**	**Better than before (+1)**
How are Afghanis reacting to our security presence?			
How are we interacting with Afghanis?			
How are we interacting with other international community actors?			
In reality, security is			
Total			

PART 4
SECTOR-SPECIFIC PROGRESS EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The following statements are to be rated on a progress scale.[43] Zero is neutral,

indicating no progress forward or backwards (neither positive or negative). Any numeral

value above zero can be considered positive progress towards meeting the CF mandate in

Afghanistan. Any numeral below zero can be considered negative progress away from

meeting the CF mandate in Afghanistan. Circle the number that applies to your

observation of progress.

There are five sectors listed and they reflect the lines of operation for post-conflict

reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. The CF Observation Reporting will most likely

be in the 'security' sector although there may be an opportunity to observe the other

sectors as well.

SECURITY

On a scale of –5 to +5, how would you rate the progress of this activity according
to the statements provided?

This activity effectively contributes to the establishment of a safe and secure
community for indigenous people.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to the development of legitimate and stable
security institutions.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to the supporting and building of indigenous
capacity in security.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

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[43] In lieu of clearly defined questions proposed by the CF, these activity statements are taken from the
'Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks' (2005) published by the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization, United States Department of State. These statements should be modified
based on the CF Campaign Plan for Afghanistan

RULE OF LAW

On a scale of −5 to +5 how would you rate the progress of this activity according to the statements provided?

This activity effectively contributes to the development of mechanisms for addressing indigenous grievances.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to the building of a legal system for reconciliation.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to indigenously acceptable institutions.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE

On a scale of −5 to +5, how would you rate the progress of this activity according to the statements provided?

This activity effectively contributes to the determination of indigenous governance structures.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to a foundation for citizen participation.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to the promotion of legitimate indigenous political institutions.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to the supporting and building of indigenous political institutions.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

SOCIAL HUMAN CAPITAL

On a scale of −5 to +5, how would you rate the progress of this activity according to the statements provided?

This activity effectively contributes to people and their communities.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to the establishment of a foundation for development

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to the institutionalization of long-term development.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

On a scale of –5 to +5, how would you rate the progress of this activity according to the statements provided?

This activity effectively contributes to responding to immediate humanitarian needs.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to the establishment of a foundation for development.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

This activity effectively contributes to the institutionalization of long-term development.

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

PART 5
CULTURE CHECKLIST

Add a check mark beside the item that reflects your observation. If you make an observation of the same item more than once, add the appropriate number of check marks. If something you observe is not in the checklist, write it into a blank square and then add a check mark.

I have observed the following emotions, types, cultural activities, traits, or activities in Afghanis:

Laughter	Boys	Sports	Jobs	Health
Sadness	Girls	Music	Enterprise	Well being
Happiness	Women	Food	Mobility	Medical Care
Respect	Men	Printed publications	Market Economies	Prosthetics
Freedom	Families	Arts and Crafts	Local currency in use	Fatigue
Pride in self	Relationships	Communication	Self-started reconstruction	Hunger
Passion	Pregnancy	Education	Trade	Tithing
Pain	Old age	Literacy	Creativity	Building of Memorials
Fear	Homes	Media	Unemployment	Graves
Neutrality	Gardens	Practice of religion	Servitude	Commemoration
Community spirit				

PART 6
PRIMARY OBSERVER INFORMATION

Rank:	Unit:	Date:	Time:

PART 7
MISCELLANEOUS

Temperature
Weather
Location
Morale
Special notes
Other

PROCESS

Roles

To facilitate the observation reporting, a process must be arranged which allows for the primary observers to complete frequent and consistent reporting; a gathering of said reports; data inputting of the observation reports into a database system; and a tech support system to assist with analysis and mapping of progress of post-conflict reconstruction. These processes can be completed by primary observers, collators, and analysts.

Primary Observers

Selected CF personnel would act as front-end collectors and observers of post-conflict reconstruction activities during missions. Observation Reports would be located in Field Message Books and would be completed on missions using the Field Message Book. Observation Reports would be torn out of Field Message Books and given to Collators during mission de-briefs.

Collators

Selected CF personnel would collect the Observation Reports from Primary Observers during mission de-briefs. The information would be inputted into a special post-conflict reconstruction database (please refer to the Tech Database on page 75). Any digital photos would be archived at this point in the process. The database will be made available to decision makers. Specific progress information will be fed back to soldiers to show the bigger picture of progress in Afghanistan.

Analysts

Trained CF personnel decision-makers will analyze the database information to measure progress. They will be able to identify areas requiring additional resources and

attention as well as identify success and failure areas. Stronger decisions can be made when using an analytical tool that illustrates progress through graphics and tech logic. Analysts can 'map' the information provided by the Primary Observers through a charting technique based on semantic differentiation and provide a 'score' that suggests positive, neutral, or negative progress. Analysts can produce progress reports based on this system of information gathering and can feed important milestones back to the Primary Observer level as well as up to other decision makers and the 3-D partners.

Support Systems

The process can be supported by employing three systems: i) the Field Message Book; ii) a Tech Database; and iii) Archiving (data and digital photo).

(i) Field Message Book

This MOE project capitalizes on the field message book that each member of the forces carries with them while in the field. It is suggested that the Field Message Book have an innovative dual purpose to support the need for post-conflict MOEs.

The first purpose is to act as a typical field book that CF is used to operating with in the field. The second purpose is new. It will contain instructions and a series of double-sided Observation Reports. These pages are intended as data collection tools to show the progress of CF post-war reconstruction projects in Afghanistan and provides a paper-based system for those with 'boots on the ground'. During deployments to Afghanistan, personnel will have the opportunity to observe CF post-war reconstruction projects and activities that support capacity building. Those involved in these types of projects are the best personnel to observe the day-to-day progress of the work completed.

An example of this prototype can be found in Part 2: Field Message Book in this binder, and supplier information appears in **Appendix A**.

(ii) Tech Database

A tech database is required to capture and display task progress, raw observation data, analysis reports and other information related to post-conflict reconstruction that reflects evolution towards an effects-based operations system of command and control in the field. A software demo has been designed and is included in <u>Part 3: Measures of Effectiveness Software</u> located in this binder. It proposes how a post-conflict reconstruction tech database software can easily be adjusted to CFJOG requirements and fulfill a much-needed systems gap.

The software has been designed to display meaningful data in an organized, easy to follow attractive manner. Neutral tones are used to represent post-conflict reconstruction and new beginnings. The images in the top right corner can be changed for each set of pages and showcase military post-conflict reconstruction tasks. The photos add a humanistic feel to the tech dashboard. Photos will be used from the Canadian Government and Canadian Forces website photo galleries. The current time and date are displayed for both Canada and Afghanistan in GMT. The software design connects the traditional combat operations symbolism with a contemporary approach to post-conflict reconstruction. The colours, photos, and other elements are meant to engage Canadian Forces personnel involved in post-conflict reconstruction to boost morale and encourage them to accept the new software application as a tool to transition from combat operations to post-conflict operations.

The software demo was designed for quick and simple navigation with a "cookie crumb" located just below the top images to highlight the screen the user is on at any given time. The cookie crumb can be used to navigate to previous screens. The tab-architecture allows the user to jump to any level of detail within 2-clicks. All summary

information will be available with 1-click navigation, meaning all levels of detail, for example, accessing reports or list of sub tasks, will always be within 1 mouse click of the main topic focus (task).

The software will have a front face dashboard, which will display a general overview of task progress in each sector, line of operation and decisive point. Clicking on a particular decisive point will highlight thematically connected decisive points. Clicking on any highlighted point will take the user to the second level screen, which will display the details of the decisive point.

The second level begins with a list of main tasks, target and actual completion dates, and three tabs of information including Viewing/Creating Observation Reports, Viewing/Uploading new Analysis Reports, and the contact information of the tasks' authenticator. Any number of main tasks can be added to this screen for each decisive point.

The Sub-Task List screen allows CF personnel to view the micro-view of post-conflict reconstruction tasks, or telescope out to the macro-view on the dashboard. This allows for the review of relevant data, which can inform sound decision-making and enhance mission success. Clicking on any particular main task will take the user to a list of sub-tasks, which must be accomplished to complete the main task objective. Any number of sub-tasks can be added to this screen to support the completion of each main task.

A check mark is added to each task when completed. Users can click on a task to identify and view the individual who signed-off on the task. The checkmarks are tallied and represent the completion of each major task. This is displayed visually.

Clicking on the tab marked "Observation Reports" takes the user to the observations reports screen. This section lists all the Observation Reports completed to date. Clicking on any one report takes the user to the details of that observation report. Data can be uploaded by Collators by clicking on the Input Reports button. The details of the report can then be entered. The data entry fields are setup exactly the same way as they appear on the paper-copy versions in the Field Message Book.

Clicking on the tab marked "Analysis Reports" takes the user to the Analysis Reports screen. Here the observation report data is analyzed and summarized and a concluding report can be uploaded in any file format. The screen will list all the reports available, when and by whom. Clicking on a particular report will allow the user to download and open the report.

Clicking on the tab marked "Contact Info" takes the user to the Contact Information screen. This screen contains all the contact information of the sign-off person and organization for this task.

There are many more screens within this application to edit, update and upload new information, such as creating new tasks, sub tasks, observation reports, analysis reports, and decisive points. The software will also allow an administrative user to create new and edit existing sectors, lines of operation, and decisive points.

During completion of a task, observation reports are conducted by Primary Observers and these are then databased by Collators. The CF determines when a task is completed. This software allows for progress to be observed in each task and sub-task as they move towards completion.

This software architecture provides the foundation for a knowledge-based command and control networked approach to post-conflict reconstruction. In the physical

domain, it permits the CF to see first and see more through data and information superiority. In the cognitive domain, it permits the CF to understand faster and better and attain knowledge superiority. It permits the CF to also want to be able to decide better and faster for decision superiority. Finally, it permits the CF to be able to act faster and more decisively in order to achieve effects superiority.

Since the software will be networked with multiple user points, which are geographically scattered, the recommended, and most cost-effective, solution is to use a web-based technology. A web-based version of the software can be secured in several ways, either restricted to operate within a local area network (LAN), which is only accessible by encrypted VPN (virtual private network). Or it can use SSL 128-bit (or higher) encryption so pages cannot be viewed by an external source (similar to how banks operate their online banking websites). The application can be developed on the Microsoft .NET platform in C# and ASPX. Flash, Javascript, and DHTML will also be used for the user interface and graphical representation. The database will be built in Microsoft's SQL Server. The site will be designed to operate on Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0 and greater. The administration section will require Internet Explorer version 5.0 or greater.

The software application will have several levels of secure access controlled by user names and passwords. There will be five (5) user levels, each with a different level of read/write access:

Level 1 – Visitor – read access to all screens. No write access allowed to any portion of the software.

Level 2 – Data Entry – read access to all screens, write access to update sub-tasks status (mark complete) and input observation reports.

Level 3 – Analysis Entry – All level 2 access permissions plus write access to upload completed analysis reports.

Level 4 – Creator – All level 3 access permissions plus the ability to create new decisive points, tasks, sub-tasks, contact information and edit existing information within those screens.

Level 5 - Administrator – Read and write access to all sections of the site, including creating new sectors, lines of operations and decisive points.

This is only a proposed security layer and can be modified to suit the final functional needs of the application.

(iii) Archiving

A web-based archival system of observation reports will provide the foundation of measuring effectiveness in post-conflict reconstruction environments. This will provide a single access point that shows progress over time. Two types of archiving will be required. The first is a text database of the observation reporting provided by the *primary observers* in the field. Please refer to **Appendix B** for an example of web-based archiving. The second is a digital photo database archive[44] that illustrates progress of particular reconstruction activities over time. Please refer to **Appendix C** for an example of web-based photo archiving used in Bosnian reconstruction projects.

It is strongly suggested that the CF adopt a photo archiving system to support the Observation Reporting database.

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[44] Note that digital video can also be used to construct progress.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the MOE process, there are additional recommendations to support the successful fulfillment of this project. It is recommended that:

1. The CF develop a mapping or scoring system to display progress which corresponds to the tech database;

2. The CF provide post-conflict reconstruction training into basic curricula of each branch and sector. Reconstruction-specific observation training is required;

3. The CF create a feed-back loop that provides consistent and updated information on post-conflict reconstruction progress to all personnel;

4. The CF harness the experience and intellect of personnel and provide a post-conflict reconstruction *Blog* (web-secure and private) to support the ongoing development of measuring effectiveness in post-conflict theatres;

5. The CF collect and archive all 3-D material informing post-conflict reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.

SUMMARY

The *Afghanistan Campaign Plan Measures of Effectiveness Project* identified criteria by which Canadian Forces personnel assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan can measure the progress of their work on a micro level, based on the macro operational campaign plan identified by DND. The criteria by which progress is measured was synthesized from four primary social science disciplines, history, geography, ethnography, and post-conflict reconstruction and has been built from base-line CF documents, amongst others, that are informing PRT operations in Afghanistan.[45] A review was provided of the policies, literature, and existing MOE systems applicable to the CF mandate in Afghanistan, and a sophisticated observation tool was developed that can be adapted to the CF mission.

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[45] This includes only the documents available prior to 1 November 2005.

The project considered measures of effectiveness with an understanding of the overlap between post-conflict reconstruction and military stability operations. The final MOE system focused upon solutions to the following questions:

4. *What are we measuring?* The CF can measure progress related to specific post-conflict reconstruction activities in Afghanistan that support the decisive points within each line of operation, especially the security sector;
5. *Why are we measuring it?* The CF can measure progress to provide a standardized system of measurement by which soldiers and decision-makers can make informed, real-time decisions that minimize the negative impacts and maximize the positive impacts of activities on stakeholders, including the CF itself;
6. *Where is 'measurement' meaningful for the CF?* Measurements of effectiveness are meaningful to the CF in the soft and hard post-conflict reconstruction activities of which it is mandated to complete in support of the Government of Canada's commitment to Afghanistan.

The aims of this project presented a serious dilemma to the team involved in its development. Because there are no established systems of measuring impacts, progress, or effects of reconstruction activities on human populations in post-conflict environments, the team had to devise a system of observing and measuring progress *and* a process for this system to operate within existing CF structures. This project presents a sophisticated yet low-tech solution for soldiers to observe day-to-day progress in the field, as well as a high-tech solution that promotes sound decision-making and a formula for reporting progress back to soldiers operating in the field. It also provides a way for the CF to become invested in network-centric post-war reconstruction initiatives.

The Government of Canada (GOC) has set out a five-year country strategy for Afghanistan, but in terms of achieving positive progress in post-conflict reconstruction activities, this time frame is not adequate for the CF to realize the GOC mandate. Nevertheless, it *is* enough time to observe progress of post-conflict reconstruction activities, consistently over-time, to establish a baseline for future progress reporting and

comparisons between theatres of operations. Therefore, it becomes critical to assess and measure CF impacts in order to positively address the stabilization of Afghanistan for the people of Afghanistan.

It will take time and commitment to build a foundation of reliable data upon which to make informed decisions on progress in Afghanistan. Only by implementing a qualitative and quantitative system will the CF be able to observe their progress in Afghanistan.

With direction from Colonel P. Stogran, Peace and Conflict Planners has created a standardized MOE approach employed through an innovative redesign of the basic CF Field Message Book. It was the goal of Peace and Conflict Planners to use tools that have common CF familiarity and purpose of use. To our knowledge this is the first instance of the CF Field Message Book having been redesigned to support mission-specific activities. The post-conflict reconstruction Observation Reports are now included in the first half of the CF Field Message Book and are the foundation of the MOE project.

With direction from Maj. I. Rutherford and Capt. M. Mendez, Peace and Conflict Planners has developed a network-centric, real-time communications and command MOE database and archival technology software. This tech package is designed to catalogue CF personnel Observation Reports as found in the Field Message Book. As the information is collected and inputted into the tech database, a real-time archival system is created by which more sophisticated and consistent decisions regarding post-conflict reconstruction activities can be made.

The GOC has a five year mandate in Afghanistan, which is an adequate timeframe for CFJOG to fully operationalize and test this MOE system, through a comprehensive understanding of PRT efforts that minimize the negative effects while maximizing the

positive effects of successful post-conflict reconstruction activities. The CF has the opportunity to apply its experience of using systems of measuring progress in typical operations, to the contemporary context of PRTs in Afghanistan, and in other theatres of operation in which it is involved in post-conflict reconstruction. There is also an opportunity for the Canadian military to lead the international field by implementing this useful system of measuring effects in post-conflict reconstruction activities, which can then be duplicated throughout the international community.

It is suggested that continued work could potentially be completed between CFJOG and PCP to provide the CF with the most advanced network-centric post-conflict reconstruction MOE system available. This type of project is aligned with Canada's NATO commitment and could highlight the CF as a sector leader in post-conflict reconstruction.

APPENDIX A
Examples of available Field Message Books from a Canadian supplier.

Al Mucher (Owner)
World Famous, Designer/Whole Seller of CF Field Message Book

333, Confederation Parkway, Concord, Ontario, L4K 4S1, Canada
www.worldfms.com Email: *Wfsales@Worldfms.Com*
Tel: (905) 738-4777 Fax: (905) 738-5052
Total cost for customized order of 10,000 units at CDN$4/unit is CDN$40,000 (plus taxes and S&H) 90 Days for delivery[46]

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[46] This information is based upon a conversation with Al Mucher on December 5, 2005 0930.

APPENDIX B

An example of a NATO web-based frequency calendar that catalogues information for archival purposes

http://www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm

NATO Update / OTAN Hebdo

"NATO Update" provides up-to-date news on NATO activities and events. Conceived for the general public, it aims to give a broad overview of Alliance-wide initiatives.

"OTAN Hebdo" présente les dernières informations sur les activités et les événements organisés par l'OTAN. Conçu pour le grand public, il vise à donner un aperçu général des activités menées par l'Alliance.

2005

July juillet	August août	September septembre	October octobre	November novembre	December décembre
January Janvier	February février	March mars	April avril	May mai	June juin

Русский - *Українська*

Previous years / Chronology

|									
2000	2001	2002	2003	2004					
1990 (Eng./Fr.)	1991 (Eng./Fr.)	1992 (Eng./Fr.)	1993 (Eng./Fr.)	1994 (Eng./Fr.)	1995 (Eng./Fr.)	1996 (Eng./Fr.)	1997 (Eng./Fr.)	1998 (Eng./Fr.)	1999
1980 (Eng./Fr.)	1981 (Eng./Fr.)	1982 (Eng./Fr.)	1983 (Eng./Fr.)	1984 (Eng./Fr.)	1985 (Eng./Fr.)	1986 (Eng./Fr.)	1987 (Eng./Fr.)	1988 (Eng./Fr.)	1989 (Eng./Fr.)
1970 (Eng./Fr.)	1971 (Eng./Fr.)	1972 (Eng./Fr.)	1973 (Eng./Fr.)	1974 (Eng./Fr.)	1975 (Eng./Fr.)	1976 (Eng./Fr.)	1977 (Eng./Fr.)	1978 (Eng./Fr.)	1979 (Eng./Fr.)
1960 (Eng./Fr.)	1961 (Eng./Fr.)	1962 (Eng./Fr.)	1963 (Eng./Fr.)	1964 (Eng./Fr.)	1965 (Eng./Fr.)	1966 (Eng./Fr.)	1967 (Eng./Fr.)	1968 (Eng./Fr.)	1969 (Eng./Fr.)
1950 (Eng./Fr.)	1951 (Eng./Fr.)	1952 (Eng./Fr.)	1953 (Eng./Fr.)	1954 (Eng./Fr.)	1955 (Eng./Fr.)	1956 (Eng./Fr.)	1957 (Eng./Fr.)	1958 (Eng./Fr.)	1959 (Eng./Fr.)
					1945 (Eng./Fr.)	1946 (Eng./Fr.)	1947 (Eng./Fr.)	1948 (Eng./Fr.)	1949 (Eng./Fr.)

APPENDIX C

An example of a web-based digital photo database showing progress over time of the post-conflict reconstruction of the Bridge of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2003-2004
http://www.gen-eng.florence.it/starimost/12_gallery/yardimg/yardimg.htm

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